TONY ALAMO CHRISTIAN MINISTRIES v. SELIG

TONY ALAMO CHRISTIAN MINISTRIES v. SELIG
Tony Alamo Christian Ministries, A Division of Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant,
Albert Ralph Krantz; Gregory Scott Seago, Plaintiffs,
v.
John M. Selig, Director of the Arkansas Department of Human Services, in his Individual and Official Capacity; Steve Mason, Administrator of the Arkansas Department of Human Services, Texarcana, Miller County, Arkansas Division, in his Individual and Official Capacity; and Gwen Lovelace, Administrator of the Arkansas Department of Human Services, Fort Smith, Arkansas Division, in her Individual and Official Capacity, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 10-1424.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: March 16, 2011.
Filed: January 11, 2012.

Before LOKEN and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges, and NELSON,* District Judge.

NELSON, District Judge.
In this appeal from the district court’s1 dismissal of a Section 1983 action on grounds of standing and Younger v. Harris abstention, Plaintiff-Appellant Tony Alamo Christian Ministries (”TACM” or “the church”) argues that it has standing to assert various constitutional claims and that the district court also erred in abstaining in deference to the pending state-court actions regarding whether the minor children of the members of the church were neglected or abused. Defendants-Appellees John Selig, the Director of the Arkansas Department of Human Services, and Steve Mason and Gwen Lovelace, two other officials of that state agency, contend that the district court relied on abstention only with respect to the individual Plaintiffs, Albert Ralph Krantz and Gregory Scott Seago—two members of the church who have not appealed the dismissal—and that TACM does not have standing to assert claims alleging a deprivation of its own federal rights much less those of its individual members.
We agree that the district court applied abstention only with respect to the individual Plaintiffs, and that it dismissed TACM solely for lack of standing. Without reaching the question of standing at the pleading stage, however, we affirm because the court’s analysis of Younger abstention with respect to the two individual Plaintiffs is equally applicable to TACM.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In September 2008, federal and state officials, including the Arkansas Department of Human Services, took custody of numerous minor children of members of TACM who lived on TACM’s property in order to protect them from abuse. After the officials removed the children from TACM property, the Arkansas state courts adjudicated many, if not all, of the seized children to be dependent-neglected. State court proceedings also resulted in the termination of the parental rights of many of the church’s members.
On April 9, 2009, Plaintiffs filed this Section 1983 action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They also simultaneously filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Defendants, after having filed their Answer, moved for judgment on the pleadings.
Plaintiffs generally allege that Defendants violated their constitutional rights, including those under the First and Fourth Amendments—and did so in bad faith—by seizing the minor children of Seago, Krantz and numerous other members of TACM and imposing certain conditions on the parents in order to regain custody of their children. In particular, TACM alleges that it has suffered, both directly and in a representational capacity, various injuries as a result of (1) the seizures of the children, (2) the alleged policies underlying those seizures, (3) the conditions imposed for the parents to regain custody of their children, and (4) the ensuing fallout from these events. The Complaint alleges that TACM “asserts its own rights, the rights of its faculty and staff, and the rights of its students, members, ministers and their families.” (App. at 13 (Compl. ¶ 19).) It also alleges that the church has standing
to assert these rights and claims because the members, ministers, students and staff would have standing to assert these rights in their own right. The Church is seeking to protect interests that are germane to its purpose; and neither the claims asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members, ministers, students, staff or their families in this lawsuit.
(Id. at 13-14 (Compl. ¶ 22).) Thus, TACM alleges not only standing in terms of its own injuries (”associational standing”), but also “representational standing” to assert the rights of its members, ministers, students and staff. “[A]n association may have standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself,” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) (referring to such as “associational standing”), and “[e]ven in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as the representative of its members,” id.
In February 2010, the district court granted Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling that (1) Younger abstention barred at least the individual Plaintiffs’ claims, and (2) TACM lacked standing. With respect to the two individual Plaintiffs, the district court ruled that granting the relief they requested in federal court would interfere with the ongoing state proceedings, that protecting children from abuse and neglect are important state interests and that the individual Plaintiffs do not contend that they will be unable to raise their constitutional claims in state court.
With respect to TACM, the district court ruled that it
does not allege any deprivation of a legally protected interest. TACM does not have a legally protected interest in its membership numbers, any charitable donations it receives, or the amount of people it serves through its outreach ministries. Because TACM has no legitimate expectation of entitlement to the aforementioned things, there is no injury to a protected constitutional interest when any of these things are diminished. Moreover, TACM cannot show that any alleged injury it has suffered is “fairly traceable” to the actions of Defendants. Because TACM cannot prove an injury in fact to a legally protected interest and cannot show a causal connect[ion] between the alleged injury and the conduct complained of, TACM lacks standing to bring its claims in this action.
(App. at 226.) Thus, it appears that the district court addressed standing only in terms of TACM’s own injuries to it as an entity.
Only TACM has appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
We review a dismissal for lack of standing under a de novo standard. E.g., St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Gaertner, 439 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 2006). Likewise, we also review a “grant of judgment on the pleadings de novo.” Poehl v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 528 F.3d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 2008). We apply the same standard used by the district court: generally, we view the facts as alleged in the non-movants’ Complaint as true and make all reasonable inferences in their favor. Id.
We need not resolve any issues of standing because, even if TACM would have standing, the district court should have dismissed not only the individual Plaintiffs, but also TACM, based on Younger abstention. We may affirm based on any grounds supported by the record. Jones v. Correctional Med. Servs., Inc., 401 F.3d 950, 951 (8th Cir. 2005). And we may affirm on abstention grounds without first resolving the standing issues. Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (”Nor must a federal court decide whether the parties present an Article III case or controversy before abstaining under Younger v. Harris.”); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999) (noting that district courts do not err when they “abstain under Younger v. Harris . . . without deciding whether the parties present a case or controversy”); see Steel Co. v. Citizens For A Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 100 n.3 (1998) (treating Younger abstention “as jurisdictional”).
Under current Younger v. Harris doctrine, federal courts should abstain from exercising their jurisdiction if (1) there is an ongoing state proceeding, (2) that implicates important state interests, and (3) that provides an adequate opportunity to raise any relevant federal questions. Plouffe v. Ligon, 606 F.3d 890, 894-95 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). In such circumstances, principles of comity and federalism preclude federal actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 & n.2 (1971) (noting companion case of Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), regarding declaratory relief).
Regarding the second component for Younger abstention, there is no doubt that state-court proceedings regarding the welfare of children reflect an important state interest that is plainly within the scope of the doctrine. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423-24 (1979) (holding that district court should have abstained where there were ongoing state-court proceedings regarding welfare of abused children). And the fact that TACM is a religious entity does not, of course, preclude application of Younger abstention. “Even religious schools cannot claim to be wholly free from some state regulation.” Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 628 (1986) (holding that district court should have abstained from action brought by religious school where it could raise its constitutional claims in state administrative proceedings).
Nor is there any doubt, with respect to the third component of Younger abstention, that the Arkansas Court of Appeals addressed several of the parents’ constitutional claims regarding the seizure of the children. For example, one parent argued, although unsuccessfully, that the state’s case plan for his children violated the Free Exercise Clause because it “makes him choose between his children and his church.” Thorne v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2010 WL 1988182 (Ark. App. May 19, 2010) (”We see no constitutional infirmity in the circuit court’s disposition order on this record.”). Accord Parrish v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., 2010 WL 1487224 (Ark. App. April 14, 2010) (expressly following Thorne). And Krantz himself raised constitutional objections, but the state court of appeals rejected them for the same reasons as in Thorne. Krantz v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., 2010 WL 1487246 (Ark. App. April 14, 2010) (unpublished), pet. for cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 925 (2011).2
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Arkansas addressed several of the parents’ constitutional issues in affirming the circuit court decisions terminating their parental rights, including those of the two individual federal Plaintiffs here, Krantz and Seago. They each contended that the termination order violated their constitutional rights to the free exercise of their religion. But the state court rejected those claims for the same reasons the court rejected similar claims in one of the companion appeals. Krantz v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2011 WL 1599339 (Ark. April 28, 2011); Seago v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2011 WL 1598969 (Ark. April 28, 2011). Accord Myers v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2011 WL 1599293 (Ark. April 28, 2011), pet. for cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 403 (2011); Reid v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2011 WL 1599266 (Ark. April 28, 2011); Parrish v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., 2011 WL 1631123 (Ark. April 28, 2011) (unpublished). The mere fact that the state courts consistently rejected those claims is, of course, no basis for the lower federal courts to entertain them in a Section 1983 action. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 99 (1980) (explaining that Section 1983 does not guarantee a federal forum for claims of deprivations of federal rights).
The first component of Younger abstention, the existence of ongoing state proceedings, is also met. Although Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on April 9, 2009, some seven months after the first state-court proceedings were initiated in the wake of the initial seizure of the children in September 2008, the various proceedings in state court were still ongoing when Plaintiffs sought relief in federal court. For purposes of applying Younger abstention, the relevant time for determining if there are ongoing state proceedings is when the federal complaint is filed. Beltran v. State of California, 871 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1989) (”Younger abstention requires that the federal courts abstain when state court proceedings were ongoing at the time the federal action was filed.”); 17B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4253 (3rd ed. 2007) (”Younger v. Harris and its companion cases went to great pains to make it clear that the rules there laid down applied only if there was a prosecution pending in state courts at the time the federal proceeding was begun.”).3
Granted, one of the first relevant state-court decisions, that involving the daughter of one of the individual Plaintiffs here, had already been issued on December 11, 2008. See Seago v. Ark. Dept. of Human Servs., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2009 WL 3852785 (Nov. 18, 2009) (noting that lower court “entered the adjudication order on December 11, 2008, finding [Seago's daughter] dependent-neglected”). In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., however, the Supreme Court ruled that Younger requires a federal court to abstain not only when and while the state trial court proceedings were ongoing, but until the state defendant (and federal plaintiff) exhausts his appellate remedies. 420 U.S. 592, 608-09 (1975) (”We therefore hold that Younger standards must be met to justify federal intervention in a state judicial proceeding as to which a losing litigant has not exhausted his state appellate remedies.”).
Here, the appeals of the state-court decisions that the minor children of Krantz and two others of Seago were “dependent-neglected” were ongoing until April 14, 2010 and February 17, 2010, respectively. Krantz v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., 2010 WL 1487246 (Ark. App. April 14, 2010); Seago v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., 2010 WL 546410 (Ark. App. Feb. 17, 2010) (concluding Seago’s two sons were dependent-neglected). Other church members’ appeals were likewise ongoing when the federal complaint was filed on April 2, 2009, as well as when the court below issued its decision on February 1, 2010. Thorne v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2010 WL 1988182 (Ark. App. May 19, 2010); Parrish v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., 2010 WL 1487224 (Ark. App. April 14, 2010).
In fact, state court proceedings were ongoing until April 28, 2011, when the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed several circuit court decisions terminating various church members’ parental rights, including those of the two individual federal Plaintiffs here, Krantz and Seago. E.g., Krantz v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2011 WL 1599339 (Ark. April 28, 2011); Seago v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2011 WL 1598969 (Ark. April 28, 2011).
But the fact that the state court proceedings are now apparently complete does not suggest that once those state-court remedies are exhausted, Younger no longer poses any hurdle to maintaining—or resuming—the federal action. Where Younger abstention is otherwise appropriate, the district court generally must dismiss the action, not stay it pending final resolution of the state-court proceedings. Beltran, 871 F.2d at 782 (”Where Younger abstention is appropriate, a district cannot refuse to abstain, retain jurisdiction over the action, and render a decision on the merits after the state proceedings have ended.”).
TACM claims that a dismissal under Younger would leave it in a “no man’s land,” “with no ability to become a party in state court yet no remedy in federal court.” (Rep. Br. at 1.) But, of course, state-court litigants such as the parents here may appeal from an adverse state supreme court decision to the United States Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Huffman, 420 U.S. at 605 (”A civil litigant may, of course, seek review in this Court of any federal claim properly asserted in and rejected by state courts.”). In fact, two members of the church sought such review here, but the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Myers v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., 132 S.Ct. 403 (2011); Krantz v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., 131 S.Ct. 925 (2011). And as we noted above, Section 1983 does not guarantee a federal forum.
The only remaining issue is whether TACM’s interests are sufficiently intertwined with those of its individual members to warrant the extension of Younger abstention to the church. The fact that TACM itself was not a party to any of the state-court proceedings does not preclude the application of Younger abstention in federal court. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 348-50 (1975) (holding that federal courts should abstain from action brought by those that have “a substantial stake in the state proceedings,” even though they were not parties to such proceedings, but whose interests were intertwined with those who were parties).
There are, of course, limitations on the application of Younger abstention to federal plaintiffs who were not state-court parties. In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975), the Court addressed an action brought by three separate corporations that each operated a bar featuring topless dancing. After a town enacted an ordinance prohibiting such dancing, each bar complied with the ordinance but filed a federal action challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. One day after filing their federal complaint, however, one of the three bars resumed topless dancing. Accordingly, it and several individual dancers were served with criminal summonses. The other two bars did not resume topless dancing until after the federal court issued a preliminary injunction.
The Supreme Court ruled that all three plaintiffs should not “automatically be thrown into the same hopper for Younger purposes.” Id. at 928. “While there plainly may be some circumstances in which legally distinct parties are so closely related that they should all be subject to the Younger considerations which govern any one of them, this is not such a case.” Id. at 928-29 (noting that the corporations “are apparently unrelated in terms of ownership, control and management”). “We thus think that each of the respondents should be placed in the position required by our cases as if that respondent stood alone.” Id. at 929 (reversing grant of preliminary injunctive relief to the one bar against which state-court criminal proceedings had been initiated, but affirming grant of injunctive relief with respect to the other two for which no state-court proceedings were pending when they filed their federal complaint).
But here, unlike the situation addressed in Doran, we are not presented with multiple, independent corporate plaintiffs. Rather, TACM is a religious entity and the two individual federal Plaintiffs are members of the church. The relationship between TACM and the individual member parents is also distinguishable from the scenario we addressed in Cedar Rapids Cellular Tel. L.P. v. Miller, where we reiterated that “[i]t is not a prerequisite to Younger abstention that the federal plaintiffs also be defendants in the action pending in state court.” 280 F.3d 874, 881 (8th Cir. 2002).
In Miller, we confronted a federal action by three companies—Cedar Rapids Cellular, Davenport Cellular, and WWC License—seeking to enjoin Iowa’s Attorney General from enforcing consumer protection statutes against them. The same day that the federal plaintiffs filed their action, the Attorney General filed a state-court action against U.S. Cellular, the parent corporation of Cedar Rapids Cellular and Davenport Cellular, two of the federal plaintiffs. Although the three federal plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Attorney General only from proceeding against them, “a group that does not include U.S. Cellular,” we held that Younger abstention applied with respect to the two federal plaintiffs in which U.S. Cellular, the state-court defendant, had “a controlling interest.” Id. at 882. We noted that the Attorney General’s “state-court action seeks an injunction against `all other persons, corporations and other entities acting in concert or participating with’ U.S. Cellular.” Id. at 882. “In contrast, the claims of WWC [License] do not seek to interfere with the proceeding in state court.” Id. Rather, its status as a plaintiff along with the other two companies was analogous to the facts of Doran, in which the Supreme Court separated the two corporations that were not subject to the state-court action from the third that was subject to the state-court action. Id. “Although WWC’s interests are generally aligned with those of U.S. Cellular, it does not have the type of close relationship with U.S. Cellular that Cedar Rapids Cellular and Davenport Cellular do.” Id.
Whether TACM’s claims are sufficiently related to, or inextricably intertwined with, those of the two individual Plaintiffs whom the district court dismissed based on Younger abstention is best approached by analyzing the nature of TACM’s alleged injuries and the relief all three Plaintiffs seek. We conclude that Younger abstention applies to TACM as well as to the two individual Plaintiffs. First, insofar as TACM seeks relief based on the injuries of the church’s individual members such as Seago and Krantz, TACM’s claims are plainly barred by Younger—the same as Seago’s and Krantz’s own claims were barred. Second, with respect to TACM’s own rights and alleged injuries, not only are TACM’s interests generally aligned with those of its members, the church shares a close relationship with its members. In short, abstention applies to TACM because it alleges standing based on injuries that are either directly or indirectly derivative of those of the individual Plaintiffs.
With respect to the injunctive relief they request, all three Plaintiffs largely make the same allegations collectively. The Complaint seems to conflate the interests of the two individual members with those of TACM when it states that
[t]he prospective damage to the Plaintiff’s [sic] is immediate and irreparable in that the Church continues to suffer loss of income, the closing of the schools, diminishment in the various ministry services offered by the Church, loss of membership, abandonment by its members and employees . . . and the requirement that all parents leave the church in order to receive custody of their children.
(App. at 53 (Compl. ¶ 154).) And although the Complaint delineates the claims of the three Plaintiffs separately, the two individual Plaintiffs re-alleged and incorporated the claims of TACM. (Id. at 43, 49 (Compl. ¶¶ 95, 127).) Moreover, Krantz alleged that the relief he sought “is synonymous with the relief sought by all Plaintiffs,” and Seago likewise asserted that “[h]is request for relief will be included in the general request for relief . . . as all plaintiffs are requesting the same relief.” (Id. at 48, 52 (Compl. ¶¶ 126, 151).)
TACM now agrees that “[i]t is quite apparent Younger abstention applies to the parents whose cases were already pending in dependency-neglect cases in [Arkansas state court].” (Br. at 10; accord id. at 19 n.54 (”It seems beyond dispute that Seago’s and Krantz’s claims are Younger barred and should never have been brought at all because all of their claims could have been brought in Juvenile court and then appealed.”), at 20 (”[T]he holding below is correct as to the parents’ claims.”).) And as it now concedes, “[t]he allegations for the church were somewhat tied to the pending dependency-neglect cases.” (Id. at 10.)
With respect to TACM’s alleged standing to recover for its own injuries, no different result is possible. Although the church asserts its own rights and alleges various injuries directly to itself, these injuries to the church nevertheless derive, in one degree or another, from the injuries of its members. Most flow directly from the individual members’ injuries. For example, the discontinuation of church services due to a “loss of workers” is caused by the fact that its individual members, including the two individual Plaintiffs here, have “fled from the church and are now in hiding.” (App. at 41 (Compl. ¶¶ 81-82).) The same “lack of workers” has allegedly caused the “tape ministry” to fall behind, the prison inmate program to suffer, the schools to have closed, and the decline in people available to distribute literature. (Id. at 41, 42 (Compl. ¶¶ 83-86, 88).) And the alleged significant decrease in donations, even if not due to a decline in donations by the now scattered members of the church, but rather to a decline in donations by non-members, would presumably derive from the publicity surrounding the seizure of the children, which of course is not unrelated to the individual members claims. (Id. at 41 (Compl. ¶ 87).)
Finally, we address the narrow exceptions to Younger abstention. At least in criminal proceedings, a federal court is not obligated to abstain where the state proceedings were initiated in bad faith or to harass the litigants, Younger, 401 U.S. at 49-54, or where the state statute is “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it,” Trainer v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 447 (1977). “While the Supreme Court has not ruled out use of the bad faith exception in civil cases, it has never directly applied the exception in such a case and we have only recognized it in the criminal context.” Aaron v. Target Corp., 357 F.3d 768, 778 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted).
Even assuming the exceptions could be available in the civil context, we conclude that they do not apply here. TACM contends that the federal Complaint was drafted intentionally to avoid Younger abstention by alleging that the Defendants conducted the investigation and seized the children in “bad faith,” that is, in order to harass and intimidate the church. (App. at 9, 12, 22-38 (Compl, ¶¶ 1, 17, 52-72).) Contrary to TACM’s argument that we must accept as true all of the allegations as pled, the numerous state appellate decisions undermine the plausibility of such allegations. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (requiring that allegations be sufficiently plausible on their face to permit court to draw reasonable inference that defendant is liable). It is difficult, if not impossible, to accept as plausible an allegation that Defendants seized the children and initiated the state proceedings to retaliate against TACM where the church concedes that “the outcome of the state cases and the affirmance in Seago I . . . [o]n November 18, 2009 would certainly support the lack of bad faith by the time the District Court ruled in February 2010.” (Br. at 18 n.52.) Yet TACM contends that “[t]hat, however, is not the point as to TACM.” (Id.) But in light of TACM’s close relationship with its individual members, we are unable to accept TACM’s attempt to distinguish any alleged bad faith with respect to TACM from any alleged bad faith with respect to the individual parents. Moreover, TACM’s concession is only strengthened now that all of the other Arkansas appellate decisions have uniformly upheld the State’s seizure of the children and the termination of their parents’ parental rights.
Accordingly, we affirm.
Footnotes
* The Honorable Susan Richard Nelson, United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
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1. The Honorable Harry F. Barnes, United States District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.
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2. With respect to the children of Seago (as well as those of other members), in contrast, the Arkansas Court of Appeals expressly declined to address their constitutional argument because they “did not raise it below.” Seago, ___ S.W.3d at ___, 2009 WL 3852785 at *___; Broderick, ___ S.W.3d at ___, 2009 WL 3853149 at *___; Myers v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., 2010 WL 1997411 (Ark. App. May 19, 2010). But that is no bar to application of Younger abstention because all that is required is that the federal plaintiff had the opportunity to raise federal issues in the state-court actions. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977) (”[A]ppellees had an opportunity to present their federal claims in the state proceedings. No more is required to invoke Younger abstention.”).
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3. In Night Clubs, Inc. v. City of Fort Smith, Arkansas, we stated that “Younger requires that the state proceeding must be ongoing at the time the district court enters its order regarding abstention.” 163 F.3d 475, 480 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Wiener v. County of San Diego, 23 F.3d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1994)). Here, the various state-court proceedings were not completed until April 2011, well after the district court’s February 2010 decision.

MYERS v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

2011 Ark. 182
BETHANY MYERS, APPELLANT,
v.
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, APPELLEE.

Opinion Delivered April 28, 2011.

JIM GUNTER, Associate Justice.
This is one of five appeals decided today that involve children who were removed from the Tony Alamo Christian Ministries (TACM) compound in Fouke, Arkansas, in September and November of 2008. In each case, the appellants are parents who have had their rights terminated as to some or all of their children.1 In this appeal, appellant Bethany Myers, whose parental rights to two of her sons were terminated, argues (1) that the case plan requirements unduly burdened her constitutional right to free exercise of religion; (2) that the circuit court erred by allowing the introduction of certain taped conversations between Tony Alamo and members of his ministry; and (3) that the circuit court erred by finding there was sufficient evidence to support the termination of her parental rights. We assumed this case because it contains an issue involving the Arkansas Constitution; therefore, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(a)(1). We affirm the circuit court.
On October 20, 2008, a joint raid was conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Arkansas State Police on the TACM compound. As a result, six juveniles were taken into foster care. Based on information obtained from those juveniles concerning the physical abuse and neglect of children whose parents or guardians are members of TACM, an emergency custody order was entered on November 18, 2008, for numerous children living at the compound, including appellant’s six children, ages four through fourteen. The next day, November 19, an amended petition for emergency custody and dependency-neglect was filed. This petition alleged that the juveniles were dependent-neglected as defined by Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(18) and that removal from parental or custodial care was necessary to protect the health or physical well-being of the juveniles from immediate danger. On December 22, 2008, a probable cause order was entered, finding that the emergency conditions that necessitated the removal of the juveniles continued and that custody would remain with the Department of Human Services (DHS).
On February 27, 2009, the court entered an adjudication order finding that the juveniles, including appellant’s children, were dependent-neglected. Specifically, the court found that the parents of these children failed to protect their children against physical abuse; endorsed and facilitated attempted illegal marriages of underage females to adult males; failed to reasonably assure that the children receive adequate educations; and failed to have the children properly immunized. The court found that return to the custody of the parents was contrary to the welfare of the juveniles and ordered that DHS continue to have custody of the juveniles. The court set the goal of the case as reunification and ordered the parents, including appellant, to: (1) submit to psychological evaluations; (2) attend and actively participate in counseling; (3) successfully complete parenting classes; (4) obtain safe and stable housing separate and apart from TACM; (5) obtain stable employment separate and apart from TACM. Appellant was also ordered to assist DHS in locating her three daughters, who were in hiding with her husband, Jim Myers.
A review order regarding appellant’s case was entered on July 19, 2009. In that order, the court found that the case plan was not moving toward an appropriate permanency plan for the children, but the goal of the case continued to be reunification. The court found that appellant had complied with the case plan by completing parenting classes and obtaining a psychological evaluation, but she had not complied with the order to disclose the location of her husband and daughters. Appellant was again ordered to obtain housing and employment separate and apart from TACM.
On December 8, 2009, a permanency planning order was entered that changed the goal of appellant’s case to termination of parental rights and adoption with respect to appellant’s three sons. The court found again that appellant had partially complied with the case plan by completing parenting classes and obtaining a psychological examination, but that appellant adamantly refused to seek independent housing or employment or to disclose the whereabouts of her three daughters. The court found that appellant and her husband, Jim Myers, had exposed their children to an atmosphere with serious risk of child abuse; were totally dependent upon TACM, which was controlled by a convicted sex offender; and refused to believe that child abuse occurred within the organization at the direction of Tony Alamo.
A petition for termination of parental rights was filed with the court on December 17, 2009. In the petition, DHS sought termination of parental rights and the authority to consent to permanent alternate placement and adoption for appellant’s three sons. The petition also noted that the parents continued to refuse to disclose the location of their three daughters. Appellant filed an answer to the petition for termination of parental rights on January 4, 2010, and alleged that there had been a substantial change of circumstances, namely Tony Alamo’s imprisonment, that eliminated or negated the reason for the dependency adjudication; that a healthy and productive family environment for the children had been restored; and that the children were no longer in danger of abuse or neglect.
On January 14, 2010, appellant filed a motion to eliminate two requirements from the case plan, specifically the requirements that she seek housing and employment separate and apart from TACM. According to appellant, these requirements interfered with her constitutional right to practice the religion of her choice and violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, the substantive due-process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and article 2, section 24 of the Arkansas Constitution. DHS responded and argued that the right to practice religion freely did not include the liberty to endanger or physically harm one’s children.
A termination hearing on appellant’s case, as well as the four other cases that are now on appeal, was held on January 27, 2010. Salisa Templeton, an employee of the Bowie County Correctional Center in Texarkana, testified that Bernie Lazaar Hoffman, also known as Tony Alamo, was recently an inmate at the facility and that recordings of his phone calls had been made. When DHS attempted to introduce a CD of the recordings, appellant objected and argued that it was inadmissible hearsay and more prejudicial than probative. DHS, on the other hand, argued that the phone calls fell under the business records exception to hearsay. The court agreed with DHS and also found that the probative value outweighed any prejudice.
The motion to eliminate the two requirements from the case plan was then discussed, and appellant stipulated that the Arkansas Court of Appeals had already decided that there was a compelling state interest to justify an initial finding of dependency-neglect.2 Appellant argued, however, that there was now a change of circumstances, specifically the imprisonment of Alamo, that rendered the two provisions regarding separate housing and employment unnecessary. Appellant also asserted that, due to these changed circumstances, there were less intrusive methods available to protect the interest and welfare of the children. Appellant argued that the current case plan infringed on her constitutional right to practice religion freely and that the threat that initially caused the children to be removed had been effectively neutralized.
DHS responded by arguing that, even assuming appellant held a legitimate religious belief and that belief was burdened by a state action, the state had a compelling interest in protecting children that justified any burden placed on appellant’s religious practices. DHS disagreed that the removal of Tony Alamo from the situation changed the circumstances in any significant way. The court ruled that appellant did have a legitimate religious belief and that the state had a compelling interest, but declined to answer whether the religious freedom of appellant was unduly burdened by the state. Instead, the court stated that it would make that ruling after hearing further testimony.
Malynda Cree, the Court-Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) program director in Texarkana, testified that she was familiar with the cases involving the children taken from TACM, including the Myers children. She testified that she acted as the supervisor for the volunteers that were appointed to the case and also worked as an advocate for the children if a volunteer was no longer available. She testified that she had listened to a large number of the phone calls between Tony Alamo and the women at the compound, and based on those phone conversations, she stated that she had great concerns about whether his control over the ministry had really changed. In her opinion, Tony Alamo was still in charge of the ministry. Several excerpts of conversations between Alamo and various women at the compound were then played for the court. Cree also testified that she had no doubt that there was potential harm to the children if they were returned to their parents because the same person, Tony Alamo, continued to control of the ministry. She explained that the parents are dependent upon the ministry for their everyday basic needs, and she did not believe the parents would be able to go against whatever Alamo told them to do. She testified that none of the parents had taken steps to rectify the conditions that caused the removal and that none of the parents had a reliable means of supporting their children independent of the ministry.
James Syler, an employee of the Office of Child Support Enforcement, testified as to the status of the child support payments for each parent. With respect to appellant, Syler testified that there was a support balance of $333.60 owed as of January 19, 2010.
The court next heard testimony as it pertained to each parents’ individual case.3 After hearing all testimony and closing arguments from counsel, the court found that the protection of the children of the State of Arkansas was a compelling state interest, and that the parents had a right to exercise their freedom of religion, but that the burden placed upon the parents’ religious freedom did not override the compelling state interest. The court found that, pursuant to its compelling interest, the state had a right to impose the separate housing and employment requirements as part of the case plan. An order terminating appellant’s rights to her two younger sons, E.M. and N.M., was entered on April 16, 2010. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from this order on May 4, 2010.4
I. Free Exercise of Religion
In her first point on appeal, appellant argues that this case should be reviewed under a strict-scrutiny standard, as it concerns a violation of her right to free exercise of religion and due process. Appellant asserts that the previous court of appeals cases that have affirmed the adjudications of dependency-neglect erroneously employed a “mere balancing of interests” instead of the required strict-scrutiny standard. Appellant urges that, under the correct strict-scrutiny standard, she should have prevailed below and that her children should have been returned to her.
Appellant insists that her children were not at serious risk, even taking into consideration all the testimony presented. Instead, her children were “lumped in” with all the other children at TACM without any individual assessment regarding her own children and her own constitutional claims. According to appellant, the juvenile court told her to “stop” serving God without offering any alternatives and, when she did not, her parental rights were terminated. Appellant insists that “[w]hile there may have been some evidence supporting a dependency and neglect finding as to other parents and children at the church property, including child abuse and some sexual abuse,” none of the evidence involved appellant’s children in particular.
Appellant states that her parental rights were terminated based on her belief system and the church she wants to attend, and that the court did not even consider other alternatives. However, according to appellant, “a far more sensitive First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment and state constitutional analysis was required.” Appellant concludes by arguing that there is no compelling state interest to justify “depopulating the Tony Alamo Christian Ministries of all family units,” nor is there any state interest in “forbidding the Appellant from continuing to live as a missionary in order to maintain custody of her children.”
In response, DHS first asserts that the court of appeals’s decision in Thorne v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2010 Ark.App. 443, ___ S.W.3d ___, should be law of the case on this constitutional issue. In Thorne, the court of appeals held, with respect to several other parents, that the requirements of separate housing and employment apart from the TACM was a narrowly tailored solution to the potential danger of living on ministry property and depending on the ministry for all basic needs, and thus presented no constitutional infirmity.
Second, DHS denies that the court ever dictated how and where appellant could pray or that the court ordered appellant to “disassociate” from the church. Instead, after finding that the environment at TACM was potentially dangerous for the children of its members, a finding that was affirmed by the court of appeals, the court ordered that appellant obtain safe living arrangements and employment to support those arrangements. DHS asserts that the requirement to secure safe and appropriate housing was a valid and neutral requirement that is not subject to strict scrutiny; the targeted conduct in this case was the failure to protect children from a dangerous and abusive situation, not the exercise of any religion. DHS insists that, in this case, the state’s compelling interest in protecting a child’s safety prevails even though religious and parental rights are asserted.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which has been applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)). In addressing the constitutional protection for free exercise of religion, the United States Supreme Court’s case law has established “the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.” City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 531. Conversely, a law failing to satisfy the requirements of neutrality and general applicability “must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.” Id. at 531-32. With regard to neutrality, the First Amendment forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of religion in general. Id. Therefore, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause “pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons.” Id. at 532.
In this case, DHS’s case plan required appellant to find alternative housing and employment separate from TACM. Despite the mention of TACM, these requirements were neutral and only incidentally affected appellant’s exercise of her religion. The target of the requirements was not any religious activity or exercise; instead, the goal was to provide a safe environment for her children, apart from the TACM compound, which the court found was, and continued to be, an unsafe environment for the children of its members. The requirement of safe and secure housing can be applied to any parent seeking to regain custody, regardless of his or her religious practices. See, e.g., Welch v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2010 Ark.App. 798, ___ S.W.3d ___ (finding that failure to secure safe and appropriate housing is contrary to children’s well-being and best interest); Carroll v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 85 Ark.App. 255, 148 S.W.3d 780 (2004) (same).
Although appellant argues that there was no evidence that her children in particular were at risk or had been abused or neglected, it was stipulated by the parties below that “the environment at the compound in Fouke is potentially dangerous for the children of its members.” Seago v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2009 Ark.App. 767, at 29, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (emphasis added); see Joint Exhibit Number 1. As the court of appeals has recognized, the court need not wait until a child has been abused or neglected to offer the protection of the state. See Brewer v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 71 Ark.App. 364, 43 S.W.3d 196 (2001) (noting that parental unfitness is not necessarily predicated upon the parent’s causing some direct injury to the child in question and that such a construction of the law would fly in the face of the General Assembly’s expressed purpose of protecting dependent-neglected children and making those children’s health and safety the juvenile code’s paramount concern). We also note the Supreme Court’s language in Prince v. Massachusetts, in which it explained:
[T]he family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty. And neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor, and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child’s course of conduct on religion or conscience. Thus, he cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.
321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (internal citations omitted). In sum, because the case plan’s requirements do not discriminate against religious beliefs or regulate or prohibit conduct because it was undertaken for religious reasons, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause do not pertain in the instant case, and the circuit court did not err in rejecting appellant’s constitutional challenge.
With respect to the opinion in Thorne, it appears that the court of appeals assumed that the case plan’s requirements of alternate housing and employment were infringements on Thorne’s right to freely exercise his religion and, based on that assumption, the court made the following findings and utilized strict-scrutiny language:
The record is full of testimony about beatings, sexual abuse, underage marriages, and other problems, all of which victimized the children of families living on ministry property. In fashioning its case plan, the circuit court responded to the potential danger with a narrowly-tailored solution—requiring Thorne to obtain housing separate and apart from the ministry. And because ministry life was communal in almost every respect, the court also required Thorne to obtain employment outside the ministry so he could earn the money to pay for this new housing arrangement and other living expenses. Here, as the circuit court implicitly concluded, the State’s interest in preventing potential harm to these children outweighed Thorne’s conscientious choice to live on ministry property, work for the ministry, and depend on the ministry for his family’s every need.
Thorne, 2010 Ark.App. 443, at 17-18, ___ S.W.3d at ___ (emphasis added). We do not disagree with the court’s conclusion in Thorne; however, because we find that the case plan’s requirements did not constitute infringements on appellant’s constitutional rights, and thus no strict-scrutiny analysis is required, we overrule Thorne to the extent that it employed such an analysis.
II. Introduction of the Telephone Conversations
This court reviews evidentiary errors under the abuse-of-discretion standard. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Huff, 347 Ark. 553, 65 S.W.3d 880 (2002). The trial court has broad discretion in its evidentiary rulings; hence, the trial court’s findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion. Id.
As explained above, the court allowed recordings of phone conversations between Alamo and women at the ministry to be introduced at the hearing. The court ruled that the recordings were business records under Ark. R. Evid. 803(6) and thus admissible as an exception to hearsay. The court also ruled that the probative value of the recordings outweighed any prejudice.
On appeal, appellant argues that the court erred in admitting the recordings as business records because the correctional facility where the recordings were made is not a “business” but a “public office.” Appellant also argues that, even assuming the correctional facility was a business for purposes of Rule 803(6), the recordings did not satisfy the criteria for admissibility. Appellant also briefly argues that the admission of the recordings violated the right to cross-examination and confrontation and that Rule 403 also justified exclusion of the recordings.
In response, DHS first asserts that the recordings were not hearsay at all because they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Instead, the recordings were offered to show Alamo’s continued control over the ministry. DHS further argues that even if some of the statements on the recording were hearsay, specifically those statements in which Alamo stated that he was in charge of the ministry, the other conversations were more than enough to show his continued control, and appellant can show no prejudice from the admission of any hearsay statements.
We agree with appellant that the recordings did not qualify as business records; however, we affirm the circuit court’s admission of the recordings because they were not hearsay. Rule 801 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence defines hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Ark. R. Evid. 801(c) (2010). The portion of the conversations played for the court essentially pertained to the day-to-day operations of the ministry and what the members of the ministry would or would not be allowed to do, in some instances even dictating what the members should be eating. These conversations were not offered for the truth of what is actually asserted by those being recorded; instead, the recordings were offered to illustrate Alamo’s continued control of the ministry. Thus, the recordings were not hearsay, and there was no error in their admission into evidence.5
With regard to appellant’s arguments based on the right to cross-examination and confrontation, we find that appellant obtained no ruling on these arguments below, thus these issues are not preserved for our review. See State of Louisiana v. Joint Pipeline Group, 2010 Ark. 374, ___ S.W.3d ___. Finally, while appellant did mention that Rule 403 justified the exclusion of the recordings, she failed to expand on this assertion. It is not the duty of this court to research or develop arguments for an appellant on appeal. Green v. George’s Farm, Inc., 2011 Ark. 70, ___ S.W.3d ___. Therefore, we will not address this argument.
III. Termination of Appellant’s Parental Rights
Our standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights is well established. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3) (Repl. 2009) requires an order terminating parental rights to be based upon clear and convincing evidence. Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Camarillo—Cox v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 360 Ark. 340, 201 S.W.3d 391 (2005). When the burden of proving a disputed fact is by clear and convincing evidence, the question that must be answered on appeal is whether the trial court’s finding that the disputed fact was proven by clear and convincing evidence was clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. Such cases are reviewed de novo on appeal. Wade v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 337 Ark. 353, 990 S.W.2d 509 (1999). However, we do give a high degree of deference to the trial court, as it is in a far superior position to observe the parties before it and judge the credibility of the witnesses. Dinkins v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 207, 40 S.W.3d 286 (2001).
In order to terminate parental rights, a trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the juvenile, taking into consideration (1) the likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted if the termination petition is granted; and (2) the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child, caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A)(i) & (ii) (Repl. 2009). Additionally, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that one or more statutory grounds for termination exists. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B).
The court heard testimony with regard to appellant’s case on January 29, 2010. Kimberly Thompson, the case worker for the Myers family, testified that she worked with appellant and that appellant did complete parenting classes and obtain a psychological evaluation. She also testified that appellant visited her children until she was incarcerated in January 2009 for contempt of court, but during her incarceration she did have telephone contact with the children. Thompson testified that appellant’s case plan was formulated after her release from jail, in August 2009, and that since appellant’s release from jail, she has had supervised visits.
Thompson testified that appellant was ordered to obtain housing separate and apart from TACM, but that appellant had never indicated a willingness to do so. Thompson also testified that she tried to assist appellant in gaining employment, but appellant never participated in the job application process. Thompson also testified that appellant continued to conceal the whereabouts of her daughters. Thompson stated that she did not feel appellant was capable of making independent decisions regarding the welfare of her children or that appellant could be trusted to obey the court orders and department requests if the children were returned to her custody.
Gayla Griffin testified that she was familiar with the Myers boys and that there were families willing to accept children with their characteristics. She conceded that one of the boys was sixteen, almost seventeen, and that it can be more difficult to place a teenager than a younger child, but she testified that there were families that would consider adopting a sibling group including a teenager. She also testified that a child must be in an adoptive placement for six months before being adopted, so it would take a minimum of six months for the boys to be legally adopted once a suitable home was found.
Appellant testified that she was incarcerated on contempt charges on January 15, 2009, and released on August 3, 2009. She testified that she was raised in the ministry, that she raised her children in the ministry, and that it was all she had ever known. She testified that she disciplined her own children when living in the ministry and that neither she nor her husband had ever sexually abused their children. She testified that in a staffing meeting in August 2009, she specifically asked a DHS worker if she would have a chance to regain custody of her boys if she obtained outside housing and employment, and the DHS worker told her probably not, because appellant had not turned in her daughters. Appellant denied any knowledge of where her daughters were and testified that she had made no effort to locate them because she believed that they were being taken care of by their father.
Appellant testified that she was in the ministry when Alamo had previously been incarcerated in federal prison and that Alamo had directed the operations of the ministry from the jail. She denied any knowledge of beatings of other children. She testified that she knew there were some girls who were married when they were young, but she did not know that some girls were married when they were twelve years old. She testified that the ministry’s policy had been changed so that no one under the age of eighteen is married. She testified that Alamo continued to run the ministry, but she denied that the ministry was a dangerous environment. She acknowledged that she was unwilling to comply with a couple of requirements in the case plan, namely to seek outside employment and outside housing.
R.M., appellant’s oldest son, testified that he was sixteen years old. He testified that he wished to be back home with his family and out of the foster care system. He testified that he did not want to be adopted but still wanted to have regular contact with his brothers, ages ten and six. He testified that no one other than his mother and father had ever disciplined him or his brothers and that he had never been abused. He stated that, upon turning eighteen, he would probably return to his mother and the ministry.
After hearing all testimony and closing arguments, the court made findings with regard to each parent or parents. Specific to appellant, the court made the following ruling:
In reference to Cause Number 2008-323, this involves the Myers family. As previously announced, the Court’s ruling regarding the respondent’s motion of constitutional issues concerning safe and stable housing requirements, that motion is denied as previously stated on the record.
Based upon the facts presented to the Court, the Court finds that the State has made meaningful efforts to restore the family and bring about reunification, that during the course of these proceedings the Court finds that the mother’s incarceration for contempt was self inflicted. Therefore, any loss of time that could have been spent toward achieving and complying with the case plan, any of that lost time was due to her own actions, not the State’s. That the father has not participated in these proceedings up to this time and has previously and continues to hide out the other minor children of this family. That Ms. Myers has failed to comply with the case plan. There is no indication from the mother that she will comply with the case plan in the future. The Court finds that the children cannot be safely returned home.
The court held that the parental rights as to the two younger boys were terminated but that the parental rights as to R.M. were not terminated, and the court suggested that an alternative solution be formulated for R.M. The court also specifically found, based on the evidence presented, that TACM remained under the strict control of Tony Alamo. “[E]ven though his physical presence may not be on the premises, the evidence indicates to the Court that the members are still submissive to his control and direction in spite of his absence from the premises. That gives the Court great concern.”
In its termination order, the court specifically considered the likelihood that the juveniles will be adopted and the potential harm, specifically the negative impact on the health and safety of the juveniles, if they were returned to the custody of their mother. Based on those considerations, the court found that termination of appellant’s parental rights was in the best interest of the juveniles. The court also found that two statutory grounds under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B) were present: (1) the children had resided outside the parental home in excess of twelve months, and despite a meaningful effort by the Department of Human Services to rehabilitate the home and correct the conditions which caused removal, those conditions have not been remedied by the mother; (2) subsequent to the filing of the original petition for dependency-neglect, other factors or issues arose which demonstrate that return of the juveniles to the family home is contrary to the juveniles’ health, safety, or welfare, and that despite the offer of appropriate family services, the parents have manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors, or rehabilitate the parent’s circumstances, which prevent return of the juveniles to the family home. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i) & (vii).
On appeal, appellant argues that there is no evidence whatsoever that appellant’s children were ever mistreated, subjected to fasting or lack of medical care, or sexually abused, nor is there any proof that the children face such dangers in the future without resorting to speculation and conjecture. Appellant argues that the sole basis for termination in this case was the possibility that the children might suffer harm in the future because of the possible continuing influence over the ministry by Tony Alamo. Appellant contends that this is mere speculation and did not constitute evidence that could support termination of her parental rights. According to appellant, this case was a “witch-hunt with fit parents caught in the crossfire and victimized by DHS in retribution for Mr. Alamo.”
In response, DHS argues that appellant has failed to argue that the circuit court’s findings with regard to the statutory factors were erroneous and has also failed to contest the court’s best-interest finding. But, even assuming that appellant has made the proper arguments, DHS argues that the circuit court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. According to DHS, the evidence showed that appellant disregarded the potential harm to the children in the TACM environment and had no intention of leaving the compound. The evidence also showed that Alamo continues to control TACM and its members’ lives and that appellant remained completely dependent on TACM for all her needs. This evidence supported the court’s findings that it was not in the best interest of the children to return to appellant’s custody and that appellant had manifested an incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues, i.e. separate housing and employment, or otherwise rehabilitate her circumstances.
We hold that the circuit court did not err in its findings supporting the termination of appellant’s parental rights. In addition to the evidence noted by DHS, there was also an admission by appellant herself that the ministry continues to be run by Tony Alamo, which fully supports the court’s finding that the compound continued to be an unsafe environment for appellant’s children. Because appellant refused to remedy the conditions that caused her children’s removal and that continued to act as a bar to her children’s return, the circuit court did not err in terminating her parental rights.
Affirmed.
Footnotes

1. See Parrish v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 10-691; Seago v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 10-693; Krantz v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 10-694; and Reid v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 10-696.
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2. This is a reference to three opinions from the court of appeals, issued on November 18, 2009, affirming the circuit court’s adjudication that several other children taken from the TACM compound were dependent-neglected. See Seago v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2009 Ark.App. 767, ___ S.W.3d ___; Broderick v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2009 Ark.App. 771, ___ S.W.3d ___; Reid v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2009 Ark.App. 784, ___ S.W.3d ___.
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3. The specific testimony relevant to appellant’s case will be discussed in Point III, infra.
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4. Note that on May 19, 2010, the court of appeals issued a substituted opinion in which it affirmed the order adjudicating appellant’s children dependent-neglected. See Myers v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2010 Ark.App. 444. This was a companion opinion to Thorne v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2010 Ark.App. 443, ___ S.W.3d ___, also issued on May 19, 2010.
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5. While it might be argued that some statements on the CD were hearsay, specifically those statements in which Alamo asserted he was still in control of the ministry, the CD was not offered for those particular statements but to show, in general, Alamo’s continued control over the affairs of the ministry. We also note that appellant’s objection below was a general objection to the CD, which contained 256 conversations totalling sixty-four hours. There was no specific objection to these particular statements made by Alamo, and without a specific objection and a ruling by the court, the issue is not preserved for our review. See Blanchard v. State, 2009 Ark. 335, 321 S.W.3d 250.
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PARRISH v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

2011 Ark. 179
CARLOS PARRISH AND SOPHIA PARRISH, APPELLANTS,
v.
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, APPELLEE.

No. 10-691.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered April 28, 2011.

JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice.
Carlos Parrish and Sophia Parrish appeal an April 16, 2010 order of the Miller County Circuit Court terminating their parental rights to their four minor children, G.P.1, G.P.2, G.P.3 and G.P.4. Relying on the analysis in the associated case of Thorne v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2010 Ark.App. 317, substituted on denial of rehearing by 2010 Ark.App. 443, ___ S.W.3d ___, the court of appeals in Parrish v. Ark. Department of Human Services, 2010 Ark.App. 327, affirmed a finding of dependency-neglect. The Parrishes assert in the present appeal that termination of their parental rights constitutes a violation of their and their children’s right to free exercise of religion, that Thorne must be reversed for failure to apply the strict-scrutiny test to the constitutional issue of free exercise of religion, that it was reversible error to admit taped conversations between Tony Alamo and unidentified women, and that the decision to terminate parental rights is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.
For the reasons set forth in Myers v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2011 Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___, decided this same date, we affirm the circuit court’s decision on the alleged violation of the right to the free exercise of religion and the decision to admit the taped conversations. As indicated in Myers, Thorne is reversed to the extent it is inconsistent with our opinions of this date.
This leaves the issue of whether the decision to terminate parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3) (Repl. 2009). Under our standard of review, a termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence and the decision of the circuit court will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. Lewis v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 364 Ark. 243, 252, 217 S.W.3d 788, 794 (2005).
The Parrish children were found to be dependent-neglected based on the Parrishes’ failure to provide the children a safe and stable home. This included that the Parrishes were raising their children in an environment where their children might be subjected to brutal physical beatings at the order of the leaders of their church. The environment in which the Parrish children lived was one where minor children were compelled to witness the public beatings of others, including minors. Beatings were administered by strikes of the hand as well as by the use of a three-foot-long wooden paddle. At the dependency-neglect hearing, G.P.1 testified that he was frightened of being beaten. The court found that the Parrishes failed to provide proper schooling required for their school-age child, physically abused their children by imposing fasts on them, and failed to have their children immunized. In Thorne it was noted that G.P.1, aged seven years, testified that his father had spanked him and two of his younger sisters with a paddle that had their names on it, and that both of his parents had slapped him on the face when he was six, leaving red marks. Thorne, 2010 Ark.App. 443, at 8, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
The Parrishes were ordered to submit to psychological evaluations, to attend counseling, to complete parenting classes, to obtain safe and stable housing separate and apart from the “Tony Alamo Ministry,” and to obtain stable employment separate and apart from the “Tony Alamo Ministry,” as well as to permit access to their home and otherwise comply with the case plan.1 The Parrishes completed the parenting classes. They also completed the psychological evaluations; however, they ceased participating in the case plan, according to them, when they concluded that “no matter what they accomplished, the children would not be returned.”
In the present proceeding, the circuit court found that the Parrishes’ children had been living outside the parental home in excess of twelve months, that their parents had failed to obtain safe and stable housing separate and apart from the Tony Alamo Ministry, and failed to find stable employment separate and apart from the Tony Alamo Ministry. The circuit court further found that the Parrishes had willfully failed to provide significant support in accordance with their means or to maintain meaningful contact with the children. They were seven months in arrears on child support at the time the order was issued. Finally, the circuit court found that the Parrishes had abandoned their children.
The Parrishes argue that retention of their children may not be predicated upon dissociating themselves from their church. They acknowledge that the State has an interest in the safety of children, but they deny that their children were actually at risk. They assert that the circuit court terminated their parental rights when they refused to comply with the court’s order to stop performing church missionary work.
With respect to housing, the environment in which the Parrishes chose to raise their children was one in which children were physically and emotionally abused, and no evidence was presented to show that the environment has improved. The Parrishes were ordered to provide a safe and stable home for their children and did not do so. We are particularly disturbed that Carlos denied knowledge of the public exhibitions of physical assaults carried out as examples to the members of their church, and we note that the circuit court specifically found that Carlos’s testimony in this regard lacked credibility. At the dependency-neglect hearing, Carlos testified that he did not believe the beatings took place and that “he had no intention of moving away from the ministry’s property.” Thorne, 2010 Ark.App. 443, at 9, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___. Despite repeated offers of assistance from the state, the Parrishes refused to seek and obtain safe and stable housing for their children.
We next consider the order that the Parrishes obtain stable employment rather than obtain sustenance from their church. Although the Parrishes allege in their brief on appeal that they are employed in the ministry for their church, in his psychological evaluation, Carlos stated that “he is in the ministry of grounds care for the church [and] he could not tell me specifically what he does or how he was reimbursed.” The evidence in this case reveals that members of the church carry out assigned tasks and are provided with housing, food, and the necessities of life at the discretion of the leaders of the church. Further, the evidence reveals that when a person disagrees with or otherwise challenges the church leadership, he or she may be put out on the street with little or no notice, money, or assets.
No evidence was offered to show that conditions have changed since the finding of dependency-neglect. If the Parrishes continued to obtain their support in life from what the church chose to provide them, then they did not have stable employment. In fact, it is not clear whether they had employment at all. It does not appear that they ever had funds in their possession by which they might have met their obligations to their children. The State made multiple offers to assist the Parrishes in obtaining stable employment, but they failed to do so. The Parrishes failed to comply with the court’s order and failed to show that they could or would provide their children with a safe and stable environment:
Parental rights are in the nature of a trust subject to their duty to care for and protect the child, and the law secures those parental rights only so long as parents discharge their obligations. Pender v. McKee, 266 Ark. 18, 582 S.W.2d 929 (1979). Further, while a parent has wide discretion and a duty under the law to rear and discipline his or her child, the discretion to discipline does not exceed the limits of reasonable parental care. See Attwood v. Estate of Attwood, 276 Ark. 230, 633 S.W.2d 366 (1982). Parental rights are not beyond limitation in the public interest. McFarland v. McFarland, 318 Ark. 446, 885 S.W.2d 897 (1994) (quoting Davis v. Smith, 266 Ark. 112, 583 S.W.2d 37 (1979)). The State’s constitutional interest extends to the welfare of the child, and parental rights are not immune from interference by the State in its role of parens patriae. Id.
Dick v. State, 364 Ark. 133, 139, 217 S.W.3d 778, 782 (2005). The Parrishes did not comply with the trust placed in them as parents. The circuit court was not clearly erroneous in terminating their parental rights.
Affirmed.
Footnotes

1. In his psychological evaluation, it was noted that Carlos Parrish had a limited “frame of reference,” and that “his perception of reality is largely filtered through his experiences in the church.” The same evaluator noted that Sophia was “comfortable in the `cocoon’ of the ministry, which provides her with her needs without a great deal of stress and responsibility on her part.”

SEAGO v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

2011 Ark. 184
GREG SEAGO, Appellant,
v.
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Appellee.

No. 10-693.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered April 28, 2011.

PAUL E. DANIELSON, Associate Justice.
Appellant Greg Seago appeals from the circuit court’s order terminating his parental rights to V.S., M.S., and N.S., and granting appellee the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) the power to consent to adoption.1 Seago’s children previously resided on the compound grounds of the Tony Alamo Christian Ministries (TACM) in Fouke, Arkansas; this appeal is one of five appeals before this court involving separate TACM families. Seago asserts three points on appeal: (1) that the termination of his parental rights violated his right to freely exercise his religion; (2) that the circuit court erred in admitting taped conversations under the business-records exception to the hearsay rule; and (3) that the grounds for termination of his parental rights were not proven by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm the circuit court’s order.
The record reveals that on September 23, 2008, a petition for emergency custody and dependency/neglect by DHS was filed in the Miller County Circuit Court relating to V.S., a female child born August 10, —-. The same day, an order for emergency custody was filed, and, on September 29, 2008, a probable cause order was filed. With respect to M.S., a male child born December 30, —-, and N.S., a male child born June 20, 1999, an amended petition for emergency custody and dependency-neglect was filed on November 19, 2008, an amended order for emergency custody was filed on November 18, 2008, and a probable cause order was filed on December 22, 2008. All three children were later adjudicated dependent-neglected, and the court of appeals affirmed those orders in Seago v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2009 Ark.App. 767, ___ S.W.3d ___ (V.S.)2 and Seago v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2010 Ark.App. 169 (M.S. and N.S.).
Subsequent review orders were entered. On February 24, 2009, the circuit court found that the case plan was moving toward an appropriate permanency plan for the children and that the goal of the case was reunification. It further found that while Seago had attended parenting classes, submitted to a DNA test, and visited the children on a regular basis, he had not complied with the court’s order or the case plan in that he had not successfully completed parenting classes, had missed his first appointment for a psychological evaluation, did not attend counseling, and had not sought or obtained housing or employment separate and apart from TACM and its members.
In its review order of May 20, 2009, the circuit court found that the case plan was not moving toward an appropriate permanency plan for the children, but that the goal of the case remained reunification. Regarding Seago, the circuit court found that he had complied with the case plan in that he had completed parenting classes, had submitted to a DNA test, had allowed DHS access to his home, and was visiting with the children. Noncompliance was found, however, in that Seago had not obtained safe and stable housing and employment separate and apart from TACM and was not attending counseling.
On September 2, 2009, the circuit court entered its final review order, finding that the case plan was not moving toward an appropriate permanency plan for the children and that the goal of the case continued to be reunification. In addition, the circuit court found that Seago had partially complied with the case plan and orders of the court in that he had undergone a psychological evaluation and had completed parenting classes. However, the circuit court also found, Seago had not complied in that he had not obtained safe and stable housing or employment separate and apart from TACM and was not paying child support on a regular basis.
A permanency planning hearing for V.S. was held on September 1, 2009, and a permanency planning order was filed September 2, 2009, in which the circuit court found, in pertinent part:
3. The Court, mindful of the available permanency planning dispositions, does hereby determine that it is in the best interest of the juvenile that the goal of the case shall be:
(1) That the juvenile cannot be returned home, parental rights will not be terminated because no potential guardian is available, and no person is available to be the permanent custodian, therefore the permanent goal shall be Another Planned Permanent Living Arrangement (APPLA).
. . . .
6. The Court finds that the Arkansas Department of Human Services has made reasonable efforts to finalize a permanency plan, specifically, referral of the parents for psychological evaluations, parenting classes, counseling, and home visits to the father’s home.
7. The Court finds that the father has partially complied with the case plan and the orders of this Court, specifically, he has gotten a psychological [evaluation], has completed parenting classes, and has paid some child support. The father has not complied in that he has not obtained safe and stable housing or employment separate and apart from the Tony Alamo Ministry, and is not paying child support on a regular basis.
In addition, the circuit court ordered Seago to obtain safe and stable housing and employment separate and apart from TACM and to continue to pay child support.
A permanency planning hearing regarding M.S. and N.S. was held on October 26, 2009, and a permanency planning order was entered on December 9, 2009. In that order, the circuit court made the following findings:
3. The Court, mindful of the available permanency planning dispositions, does hereby determine that it is in the best interest of the juveniles and that the goal of the case shall be:
(1) That parental rights will be terminated and the goal will be adoption.
. . . .
6. The Court finds that the Arkansas Department of Human Services has made reasonable efforts to finalize a permanency plan, specifically, a) referred Greg Seago for a psychological evaluation; . . . d) referred Greg Seago for individual counseling; e) providing parenting classes for Greg Seago; . . . g) offered to assist Greg Seago in applying for public or Section 8 housing; h) offered to assist Greg Seago in seeking independent employment at the Work Force Center; i) have attempted home visits to Greg Seago’s current home; . . . [and] l) have offered to assist Greg Seago with transportation.
7. Greg Seago has partially complied with the case plan in that he has: a) completed parenting classes; b) has gotten a psychological evaluation; c) child support has been paid by the Tony Alamo Christian Ministries; d) has visited regularly with the juveniles. Greg Seago has not substantially complied with the case plan in that he has: a) adamantly refused to seek safe and stable independent housing for the juveniles; b) adamantly refused to seek independent employment; c) has refused to attend individual counseling as recommended by the psychological evaluation. With respect to Greg Seago the Court further finds: a) that he exposed his children to an atmosphere with a serious risk of child abuse; b) that he did not take appropriate action to protect his children from abuse or the risk of abuse; c) that Greg Seago is totally dependent upon an organization headed by a convicted sex offender; d) that Greg Seago does not believe that child abuse occurred within the confines of that organization at the direction of its leader, Tony Alamo.
Additionally, the circuit court ordered Seago to attend counseling as recommended by the psychological evaluation, continue to pay child support, and obtain safe and stable housing and employment separate and apart from TACM and maintain both for at least six months.
On December 17, 2009, DHS petitioned the circuit court to terminate Seago’s parental rights to M.S. and N.S. In addition, a separate petition by attorney ad litem, Amy Freedman, sought to have the circuit court terminate Seago’s parental rights to V.S.
With respect to M.S. and N.S., the respective petition alleged the following grounds:
a. the minor children, [M.S. and N.S.], have been adjudged to be [ ] dependent-neglected children and currently reside in the care and custody of the Arkansas Department of Human Services pursuant to order of the Miller County Chancery Court, Juvenile Division. The minor children have resided outside the parental home of the parents, Greg Seago and Gina Baskin, for a period in excess of twelve months and, despite a meaningful effort by the Arkansas Department of Human Services to rehabilitate the home and correct the conditions which caused removal, those conditions have not been remedied by the parents. Services provided by the Department include, referred Greg Seago for a psychological evaluation, referred Gina Baskin for a psychological evaluation, referred Gina Baskin for individual counseling, referred Greg Seago for individual counseling, provided parenting classes for Greg Seago, referred Gina Baskin for parenting classes, offered to assist Greg Seago in applying for public or Section 8 housing, offered to assist Greg Seago in seeking independent employment at the Work Force Center, have attempted home visits to Greg Seago’s current home, have assisted Gina Baskin in obtaining housing, have assisted Gina Baskin with transportation, and have offered to assist Greg Seago with transportation.
The petition further stated that,
subsequent to the filing of the original petition for dependency-neglect, other factors or issues arose which demonstrate that a return of the juvenile[s] to the family home is contrary to the juveniles’ health, safety, or welfare, and that, despite the offer of appropriate family services, the parent has manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy the issues or factors, or rehabilitate the parent’s circumstances, which prevent return of the juveniles to the family home.
Regarding V.S., the respective petition asserted the following grounds:
a. the minor child, [V.S.], has been adjudged to be a dependent-neglected child and currently resides in the care and custody of the Arkansas Department of Human Services pursuant to order of the Miller County Circuit Court, Juvenile Division. The minor child has resided outside the parental home of the parents, Gina Baskin and Greg Seago, for a period in excess of twelve months and, despite a meaningful effort by the Arkansas Department of Human Services to rehabilitate the home and correct the conditions which caused removal, those conditions have not been remedied by the parents. Services provided by the Department include referral of the parents for parenting classes, counseling, psychological evaluations, assistance in obtaining safe and stable housing and employment separate and apart from the Tony Alamo Ministry and referral of the juvenile for counseling.
It similarly alleged that,
subsequent to the filing of the original petition for dependency-neglect, other factors or issues arose which demonstrate that return of the juvenile to the family home is contrary to the juvenile’s health, safety, or welfare, and that, despite the offer of appropriate family services, the parent has manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy the issues or factors, or rehabilitate the parent’s circumstances, which prevent return of the juvenile to the family home.
Seago answered the petitions and also filed a motion to eliminate two requirements from the case plan, in which he claimed that the requirements that he find separate housing and employment from TACM unduly interfered with his constitutional right to practice the religion of his choice. DHS responded, asserting that the prerequisites for reunification—employment and housing separate from TACM—were narrowly tailored to further the State’s compelling interest of protecting the Seago children from physical and sexual abuse and neglect if returned to Seago.
On January 27-28, 2010, a termination hearing was held with respect to the Seago children, as well as to the children from the other TACM families, during which the circuit court heard arguments on Seago’s motion. Certain facts were jointly stipulated to, including, in pertinent part, that
Children were adjudicated dependent-neglected.
The Court of Appeals in Seago v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Services found the evidence adduced at the environment at the compound in Fouke is potentially dangerous for the children of its members.
. . . .
Children have been out of the home for more than 12 months.
The parents failed to obtain safe and stable housing separate and apart from the Tony Alamo Christian Ministries and its members.
The parents failed to obtain stable employment separate and apart from the Tony Alamo Christian Ministries and its members.
. . . .
The parents had the opportunity to participate in staffings.
. . . .
Parents had the opportunity to provide input on the case plan.
. . . .
The parents obtained psychological evaluations by a psychological examiner licensed in the State of Arkansas and approved by the Department.
. . . .
The parents successfully completed parenting classes.
. . . .
The parents have been visiting their children as outlined in the visitation plan.. . . Tony Alamo calls members of the TAMC [sic] on a regular basis from the telephone at the Bowie County Correctional Facility.
The parents continue to live in a collective environment in which their earnings and labor belong to the church, which provides for the parents’ needs.
. . . .
Burt Krantz and Greg Seago testified on behalf of Tony Alamo at Tony Alamo’s federal criminal sentencing hearing.
In addition, the circuit court heard testimony from all parties. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court ruled on Seago’s constitutional claim and the termination petition, stating, in pertinent part:
[I]t is this Court’s opinion that the protection of the children in the State of Arkansas is a strong compelling interest. No question in my mind about that. It is also true that the parents have a right, as I said, to exercise their freedom of religion. I believe that the way that you exercise that is legitimate. It is not one that is just made up out of the air religion or practice. I think it is one that you, that’s sincere and I think the facts show that it has existed for a considerable length of time.
Does the State’s compelling interest here burden that to some extent by the requirements that we are talking about that the State has been talking about in these case plans, i.e.[,] that you maintain a safe and stable home and employment separate and apart from living on the premises of the Tony Alamo Christian Ministry’s property. It does burden it to some degree, but does it reach that point that that overrides the compelling state interest. No, that is not my opinion that it does.
So my opinion as to each of the families is that the State has a strong compelling interest in protecting the children involved in each of these cases and that compelling interest has existed from the beginning of the adjudication of this case up until today. And my opinion is it will continue in the future, not as to just the children involved in these cases, but to all children within the boundaries of the State of Arkansas.
So we get to the next, the State has a strong compelling interest. And therefore, having that strong compelling interest it had the right to impose these requirements on the parents as part of its case plan, i.e.[,] housing and employment. And I focus on those because the motion focused on those and because in most cases the parents have otherwise complied with the case plan, but the motion specifically addressed the housing and employment.
. . . .
As to Cause Number JV-2008-263, which is the Seago family. Again, the Court’s position regarding the respondent’s motion of eliminating the requirements of housing and employment pursuant to the constitutional arguments made, that motion is denied for the reasons previously stated on the record.
The Court finds from the facts produced during the course of these proceedings that the State has made meaningful efforts to achieve reunification, provide services, that Mr. Seago has failed to comply with the Court’s case plan, and has stated his unwillingness to comply with those requirements for safe and stable housing and employment outside the Tony Alamo Christian Ministries.
The Court finds the children cannot safely be returned home, that the parental rights of Mr. Seago are hereby terminated and the State is authorized to proceed with the goal of adoption. The Court finds the respondent’s testimony not credible.
The court further made findings regarding TACM, stating,
It is from the evidence presented before this Court one of the big concerns for this Court is, and the Court also finds from the facts that the overall operation and conduct of the Tony Alamo Ministries remains under the strict control of Mr. Alamo.
The evidence produced to this Court confirms that.
The Court well understands, well understands that Mr. Alamo is restricted and is incarcerated in the custody of the United States Government, but up to this point the fact that he has been incarcerated for such a length of time here at the Bowie County Correctional Institute shows no signs of his exercising authority and control over the ministry [diminishing]. And even though his physical presence may not be on the premises, the evidence indicates to the Court that the members are still submissive to his control and direction in spite of his absence from the premises. That gives the Court great concern and in spite of the respondents’ attempt to convince the Court that the federal restrictions will somewhat tie his hands more than what has been done in the past, those regulations still appear to give him considerable freedom.
Also a question in my mind as to one of the things that has been argued here today is whether or not the restriction concerning exercise of a business entity will be synonymous with the exercise of a religious ministry. And I will restate what I have said before. My orders have not prevented the respondents from attending the religious activities on the premises of Tony Alamo Christian Ministries and participating to the full extent, with the exception of eliminating total dependence upon the whim of Mr. Alamo.
Mr. Alamo from the evidence turns the valve on and off as to the financial stability of that ministry. If there [are] any decisions made on major expenditures, acquisition of assets, selling of assets, all of that is made at his discretion. There has been no evidence submitted to this Court that anyone other than he does that. Therefore, the parties are totally dependent on whether he wants to keep that house or keep that car or spend that money here or elsewhere. No one else has any control of that but him. And I can tell you he sure believes that based on the evidence presented in this courtroom. And because of that uncertainty, it makes, and because of his conviction now, that uncertainty of having a place to live may be reduced even further if the federal government determines that they can seize that property, then the families are out in the cold.
On April 16, 2010, the circuit court filed its order terminating Seago’s parental rights and granting DHS the power to consent to adoption. Therein, it found that DHS had proved by clear and convincing evidence that
the minor children have resided outside the parental home of the parents in excess of twelve months, and despite a meaningful effort by the Department of Human Services to rehabilitate the home and correct the conditions which caused removal, those conditions have not been remedied by the parents in that Greg Seago has refused to seek stable housing and employment separate and apart from the Tony Alamo Ministry.
. . . .
[T]he minor children’s parents, Gina Baskin and Greg Seago, have willfully failed to provide significant material support in accordance with their means in that Gina Baskin and Greg Seago are currently in arrears on their child support.
. . . .
[S]ubsequent to the filing of the original petition for dependency-neglect, other factors or issues arose which demonstrate that return of the juveniles to the family home is contrary to the juveniles’ health, safety, or welfare, and that, despite the offer of appropriate family services, the parent has manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors, or rehabilitate the parents’ circumstances, which prevent return of the juveniles to the family home.
It further found that it
considered the likelihood that the juveniles will be adopted and the potential harm, specifically the negative impact on the health and safety of the juveniles of returning them to the custody of their parents and the Court finds that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the juveniles.
. . . .
[And that] the testimony of Greg Seago was not creditable.
Seago now appeals.
For his first point on appeal, Seago argues that his right to freely exercise his religion, which he claims is a fundamental right, was violated by the case plan’s requirements that he both move away from and cease working for TACM. He contends that strict-scrutiny review was required and that the case plan’s requirements were in no way the least restrictive means. He claims that his children “were not seriously at risk,” and that, applying the strict-scrutiny standard to his case, he should have prevailed and his children should have been returned to him. He finally contends that this court should overturn the court of appeals’ decision in Thorne v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2010 Ark.App. 443, ___ S.W.3d ___, asserting that it erroneously applied a balancing test rather than the required strict scrutiny. For the reasons set forth in Myers v. Department of Human Services, 2011 Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___, delivered this same day, we affirm.
For his second point on appeal, Seago argues that the circuit court erred in admitting as business records certain taped conversations of TACM’s leader, Tony Alamo, recorded while he was detained in a correctional facility. He contends that the recordings were not business records due to the fact that the correctional facility in which the recordings were made was a public office and not a business. He further contends that even if the prison was a business, the contents of the recordings were not relied upon by the prison, thereby disqualifying the records from constituting business records. Finally, he claims, the admission of the recordings violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. For the reasons set forth in Myers, supra, on this issue, we affirm.
For his final point on appeal, Seago argues that the termination of his parental rights was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. He contends that there is nothing in the record to suggest that any of his children “have ever, ever been mistreated, subjected to hunger or lack of medical care, nor have they been in real danger of sexual abuse.” (Emphasis in original.) He maintains that the sole basis for terminating his rights was his guilt by association with Alamo and the speculative belief that Alamo would break prison rules in the future and impose his will upon TACM parents over the phone. For these reasons, he asserts that the termination of his parental rights should be reversed. DHS counters that the requisite findings were made and not clearly erroneous; therefore, it asserts, the circuit court’s order should be affirmed.
Our standard of review for cases involving the termination of parental rights is well established. See Posey v. Arkansas Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 370 Ark. 500, 262 S.W.3d 159 (2007). Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-27-341(b)(3) (Repl. 2009) requires an order forever terminating parental rights to be based upon clear and convincing evidence. Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. See id. When the burden of proving a disputed fact is by clear and convincing evidence, the question that must be answered on appeal is whether the circuit court’s finding was clearly erroneous. See id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See id. Such cases are reviewed de novo on appeal. See id. This court does, however, give a high deference to the circuit court because that court is in a far superior position to observe the parties before it and to judge the credibility of the witnesses. See id.
An order forever terminating parental rights shall be based upon a finding by clear and convincing evidence:
(A) That it is in the best interest of the juvenile, including consideration of the following factors:
(i) The likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted if the termination petition is granted; and
(ii) The potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child, caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent, parents, or putative parent or parents; and
(B) Of one (1) or more of the following grounds:
(i)(a) That a juvenile has been adjudicated by the court to be dependent-neglected and has continued to be out of the custody of the parent for twelve (12) months and, despite a meaningful effort by the department to rehabilitate the parent and correct the conditions that caused removal, those conditions have not been remedied by the parent.
(b) It is not necessary that the twelve-month period referenced in subdivision (b)(3)(B)(i)(a) of this section immediately precede the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights or that it be for twelve (12) consecutive months;
(ii)(a) The juvenile has lived outside the home of the parent for a period of twelve (12) months, and the parent has willfully failed to provide significant material support in accordance with the parent’s means or to maintain meaningful contact with the juvenile.
(b) To find willful failure to maintain meaningful contact, it must be shown that the parent was not prevented from visiting or having contact with the juvenile by the juvenile’s custodian or any other person, taking into consideration the distance of the juvenile’s placement from the parent’s home.
(c) Material support consists of either financial contributions or food, shelter, clothing, or other necessities when the contribution has been requested by the juvenile’s custodian or ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
(d) It is not necessary that the twelve-month period referenced in subdivision (b)(3)(B)(ii)(a) of this section immediately precede the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights or that it be for twelve (12) consecutive months;
(iii) The presumptive legal father is not the biological father of the juvenile and the welfare of the juvenile can best be served by terminating the parental rights of the presumptive legal father;
(iv) A parent has abandoned the juvenile;
(v)(a) A parent has executed consent to termination of parental rights or adoption of the juvenile, subject to the court’s approval.
(b) If the consent is executed under oath by a person authorized to administer the oath, the parent is not required to execute the consent in the presence of the court unless required by federal law or federal regulations;
(vi)(a) The court has found the juvenile or a sibling dependent-neglected as a result of neglect or abuse that could endanger the life of the child, sexual abuse, or sexual exploitation, any of which was perpetrated by the juvenile’s parent or parents or step-parent or step-parents.
(b) Such findings by the juvenile division of circuit court shall constitute grounds for immediate termination of the parental rights of one (1) or both of the parents;
(vii)(a) That other factors or issues arose subsequent to the filing of the original petition for dependency-neglect that demonstrate that return of the juvenile to the custody of the parent is contrary to the juvenile’s health, safety, or welfare and that, despite the offer of appropriate family services, the parent has manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate the parent’s circumstances that prevent return of the juvenile to the custody of the parent.
(b) The department shall make reasonable accommodations in accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., to parents with disabilities in order to allow them meaningful access to reunification and family preservation services.
(c) For purposes of this subdivision (b)(3)(B)(vii), the inability or incapacity to remedy or rehabilitate includes, but is not limited to, mental illness, emotional illness, or mental deficiencies;
(viii) The parent is sentenced in a criminal proceeding for a period of time that would constitute a substantial period of the juvenile’s life; or
(ix)(a) The parent is found by a court of competent jurisdiction, including the juvenile division of circuit court, to:
(1) Have committed murder or manslaughter of any juvenile or to have aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit the murder or manslaughter;
(2) Have committed a felony battery that results in serious bodily injury to any juvenile or to have aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit felony battery that results in serious bodily injury to any juvenile;
(3)(A) Have subjected any juvenile to aggravated circumstances.
(B) “Aggravated circumstances” means:
(i) A juvenile has been abandoned, chronically abused, subjected to extreme or repeated cruelty, sexually abused, or a determination has been made by a judge that there is little likelihood that services to the family will result in successful reunification; or
(ii) A juvenile has been removed from the custody of the parent or guardian and placed in foster care or in the custody of another person three (3) or more times in the last fifteen (15) months;
(4) Have had his or her parental rights involuntarily terminated as to a sibling of the child; or
(5) Have abandoned an infant, as defined at § 9-27-303(2).
(b) This subchapter does not require reunification of a surviving child with a parent who has been found guilty of any of the offenses listed in subdivision (b)(3)(B)(ix)(a) of this section.
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3) (Repl. 2009). We cannot say that we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made by the circuit court.
Here, Malynda Cree, a program director for CASA, testified that, in her opinion, the environment of the TACM compound, where Seago continued to live, remained unsafe, due to Alamo’s continued directives from prison. She testified that the risk of harm from the conditions described by the court of appeals remained; specifically, she pointed to the fact that the TACM parents remained dependent on the ministry for their everyday, basic needs. She stated her belief that the children would not be safe if returned to their parents’ custody, as long as the parents continued in the same community with the endangering factors that were previously present, such as physical beatings, fasting, and underage marriage. She testified that the parents had not taken steps to rectify the conditions that caused removal in that they continued to remain in the same living conditions, having failed to obtain and maintain safe and stable housing apart from TACM.
Ms. Cree further testified that the parents’ current housing on the compound was not safe or stable due to the fact that the federal government had the ability to seize the property, on which the parents were living, in conjunction with Alamo’s arrest and conviction. She stated that such instability was potentially harmful to the families’ children. She further stated that none of the parents had reliable means to support their children independent of TACM, which currently supplied all of their needs. She testified that, while it was a hard decision, she believed that there was a potential risk of harm to the health and safety of the children caused by their parents’ lack of stable employment or means to support them and that she could not recommend the children be returned to their parents based on the parents’ lack of compliance and the children’s endangerment.
James Syler of the Office of Child Support Enforcement testified that Seago’s balance for child support was $112. Cindy Allen, a family service-worker supervisor with the Division of Children and Family Services, also testified. She stated that one of the needs identified in the Seago case plan—safe and stable housing for his children separate and apart from TACM—had not been achieved. She testified that, while she had offered to transport Seago to the housing-authority office, as well as the Texarkana Work Force, and offered to help him look online for jobs, Seago had not accepted her offers. She stated that, to her knowledge, Seago did not have employment separate and apart from TACM. She further testified that, while individual counseling was recommended for Seago and that a referral was made, she had no information that he had ever participated in such counseling. She also testified that she did not believe it was in the children’s best interest to be returned to Seago’s custody, because she believed that there would be a great risk of harm to the children’s health and safety. Specifically, Ms. Allen feared for the boys’ physical safety and V.S.’s mental and physical safety.
Gayla Griffin, an adoption-specialist supervisor, testified with respect to the children’s likelihood of adoption. She testified that, within her database, they had families that would be interested in adopting children with the characteristics of V.S., M.S., and N.S. She stated that based on the information she had, the three Seago children would be adopted.
B.S., a fifteen year old, also testified. A biological child of the Seagos, she testified she left the ministry and currently lived with her mother, Gina. She testified that when she lived with her father, he would often leave town to “track,” leaving them in the homes of other TACM families. She testified that when she was fourteen years old, she moved into Alamo’s house, where she suffered physical abuse, and that her father did not protect her. She further testified that when her brothers got into trouble, her father would beat them with a board. She stated that she did not feel that her sister and brothers would be safe if they were returned to her father’s custody, because she did not believe that he had “changed.” She further testified that her siblings’ health and safety would be threatened if they were to go back.
Seago also testified. He stated that he was called to serve the Lord “twenty-four seven in a missionary style” and that he could not continue that if he obtained separate housing and employment from TACM. He testified that the reason he did not seek separate housing and employment apart from TACM was “because of the fear of the Lord because of the calling that I have on my life.” He stated that there was nothing that DHS could have done for him to obtain housing or employment separate and apart from TACM.
Seago testified that Alamo was still the pastor of the church and that the church was still running according to the practices and preaching of Alamo. He testified that he “absolutely” subscribed to the practices and beliefs of TACM. He further stated that he believed whatever the Bible said about “when a girl reaches puberty she is old enough to consent to be married” and that the Bible teaches about the use of corporeal punishment for recalcitrant children. He further confirmed his belief that Alamo was a prophet and stated that he did not believe that B.S. or V.S. were in danger when they lived in Alamo’s home. Seago also admitted that he had not obtained separate employment or housing from TACM. In addition, as already set forth, it was stipulated by the parties that the Seago children had been adjudicated dependent-neglected and had been out of the home for more than twelve months.
Our review of the foregoing reveals that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of Seago’s parental rights to V.S., M.S., and N.S. Specifically, the record makes clear that Seago failed to remedy the conditions that caused removal by failing to obtain housing and employment separate and apart from TACM, despite DHS’s meaningful efforts. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s order terminating Seago’s parental rights.
Affirmed.
Footnotes

1. The circuit court’s order also terminated the rights of the children’s mother, Gina Baskin, after she voluntarily consented to termination; however, she is not a party to this appeal.
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2. In the opinion, the court thoroughly set forth the facts supporting the circuit court’s finding. Suffice it to say that the grounds included both physical and sexual abuse of children residing at the TACM compound, where the Seago children had lived.
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KRANTZ v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

2011 Ark. 185
MIRIAM KRANTZ AND ALBERT KRANTZ, Appellants,
v.
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Appellee.

No. 10-694.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered April 28, 2011.

KAREN R. BAKER, Associate Justice.
Appellants Miriam Krantz and Albert Krantz appeal from a Miller County Circuit Court order terminating their parental rights to their six children: L.K., born September 23, —-; A.K., born April 20, —-; A.K.2, born November 10, —-; S.K., born August 1, —-; C.K., born June 28, —-; and R.K., born September 1, —-. On appeal, they argue that the trial court erred in terminating their parental rights because: the order violated their rights, and those of their children, guaranteed under the federal and state constitutions; the circuit court erred in ruling that taped conversations between Tony Alamo and unidentified women were admissible; and the circuit court’s finding that the juveniles faced potential harm if returned to the custody of the Kranztes was based upon speculation and conjecture. This case presents an issue involving the Arkansas Constitution. Therefore, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(1) (2010). We affirm.
This case is one of five cases decided today that involves children who were removed by appellee Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) from the compound of the Tony Alamo Christian Ministries (”the TACM”) in Fouke, Arkansas. The procedural history of these cases is set forth in Myers v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2011 Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___.
On November 18, 2008, an ex parte order for emergency custody was entered by the Miller County Circuit Court for the Krantz children, which placed the children in the custody of DHS. A probable cause order was entered on December 22, 2008, reflecting that the Krantzes stipulated to probable cause, that the conditions existing at the time of the emergency order continued to exist, and that custody of the juveniles should remain with DHS. On February 9, 2009, the juveniles were adjudicated dependent-neglected.1
At the October 27, 2009 permanency-planning hearing, the court found that it was in the best interests of the juveniles that the parental rights be terminated and that the goal was adoption. The court determined that despite reasonable efforts by DHS, the conditions that caused the children to be removed had not been remedied; in that, the Krantzes had adamantly refused to obtain safe, stable, independent housing, or seek independent employment apart from TACM, and that Albert Krantz refused to attend counseling as recommended in his psychological evaluation. The court found that the Krantzes had exposed the juveniles to an atmosphere with a serious risk of child abuse, that the parents were totally dependent upon an organization headed by a convicted sex offender, and that they refused to believe that child abuse had occurred within the confines of the TACM. On April 15, 2010, the circuit court entered an order terminating the parental rights of the Krantzes. This appeal followed.
I. Free Exercise of Religion
The Krantzes argue that the termination order violates their parental rights and the rights of their children under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article 2, section 24 of the Arkansas Constitution. They assert that Thorne v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2010 Ark.App. 443, ___ S.W.3d ___, should be overruled because it violates this court’s standard of review in free-exercise-of-religion cases. For the reasons set forth in Myers, supra, we affirm the circuit court’s decision.
II. Admission of the Telephone Conversations
The Krantzes argue for reversal that the evidence relied upon by the trial court in terminating their parental rights was improperly admitted. Specifically, they assert that the taped conversations between Tony Alamo while at the Bowie County Correctional Facility and unidentified TACM members were hearsay, and that their probative value was outweighed by their prejudicial effect. For the reasons set forth in Myers, supra, we affirm the circuit court’s decision.
III. Evidence of Potential Harm
The Krantzes assert that “the grounds for termination of [their] parental rights were not proven by clear and convincing evidence.” However, they only challenge the finding of the circuit court regarding the potential harm the juveniles would face if returned to the custody of the Krantzes. Termination of parental rights is a two-step process. J.T. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 329 Ark. 243, 947 S.W.2d 761 (1997). The first step is proof of a statutory ground. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3). Because the Krantzes do not challenge the statutory grounds in support of the termination order, we need not address this issue.
The second step requires consideration of the likelihood that the juveniles will be adopted and the potential harm caused by returning the custody of the children to the Krantzes. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A). The Krantzes do not challenge the likelihood that their children will be adopted; however, they do challenge the finding required by Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A)(ii) that an order forever terminating the parental rights shall be based upon a finding of “[t]he potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child, caused by returning the child to the custody of the . . . parents.” We therefore address only whether the evidence supported the circuit court’s finding on potential harm.
Joint Exhibit Number 1 was admitted into evidence at the termination hearings of Bethany Myers, Alphonzo Reid, Greg Seago, Carlos and Sophia Parrish, and the Kranztes. It was a joint stipulation between all of the above-referenced parties and DHS to numerous facts applicable to all of the parents. The relevant stipulations were: that the parents failed to obtain safe and stable housing separate and apart from the TACM and its members; that the parents failed to obtain stable employment separate and apart from the TACM and its members; that the parents have refused to obtain housing and employment separate and apart from the TACM because the parents believe these requirements to be unconstitutional violations of the First Amendment right of parents to the free exercise of religion; that Tony Alamo was criminally convicted in federal court of violation of the Mann Act; that Tony Alamo has telephone privileges at the Bowie County Correctional Facility; that Tony Alamo calls members of the TACM on a regular basis; that the parents continue to live in a collective environment in which their earnings and labor belong to the TACM, which provides for the parents’ needs; that Albert Krantz and Greg Seago testified on behalf of Tony Alamo at Tony Alamo’s federal criminal sentencing hearing; and, that testimony and exhibits from all of the cases would be incorporated into each case.
Miriam Krantz testified that she worked for the TACM as a cook and in the audio department and that she was afraid of losing her husband, Albert Krantz, if she left the TACM to find separate housing and employment as required by the DHS case plan. She said that her commitment to God precluded her from leaving the TACM. She admitted that Tony Alamo was informed that she wanted to use TACM’s money to buy clothes for her children, but denied that his permission was required, even though in the taped conversation Tony Alamo said to “give her the money.” She said that she had no knowledge of the rapes of minor children affiliated with the TACM until many months after her children were taken by DHS. She testified that she was aware that young girls lived in Tony Alamo’s home, but she thought they lived there of their own free will. She denied having any personal knowledge about children affiliated with the TACM being beaten, but she admitted learning of the beatings through newspaper articles. She admitted being aware of a claim that Tony Alamo had molested a girl while at a federal correctional institution but asserted that she had no personal knowledge of it. She denied that abuse would have to happen before her eyes before she would believe it, but she repeatedly stated that as she had no personal knowledge of the abuse, she did not believe that abuse had occurred at the TACM.
Miriam Krantz admitted that if she broke a rule or regulation of the TACM, she could be ejected from the home provided to her by the ministry. She testified that they received forty dollars a week for discretionary spending. Expensive items, such as surgery, were submitted to Tony Alamo for his approval, but other items were submitted to a person at the TACM who cut a check. She said that for the past several months she has kept a vehicle owned by the ministry with her at all times, whereas in the past she had been required to check it out when she wanted to use it. Although she stated that she would never allow her children to participate in underage marriages, she found nothing wrong with Tony Alamo’s underage marriages. She also stated that she would never let her children be abused.
Albert Krantz testified that he did not do what was required of him to get his children out of foster care because his conscience would not allow him to follow the case plan. He said that he believed his eternal soul would be condemned to damnation if he were to leave the ministry. He stated that he would never allow his children to marry while underage but opined that the Bible permitted such marriages. He said that he had not followed, and would not follow, the court’s orders to get his children back.
Malynda Cree testified that she was the program director of Court Appointed Special Advocates for children. She had been involved with the Krantz, Seago, Parrish, Myers, and Reid cases since they began in September 2008, and did not believe that the running of the TACM had changed. She stated that Tony Alamo continues to direct the day-to-day operations of the TACM through his approval of payment of the TACM’s bills, his requirement that the TACM members report infractions to him of other members’ conduct, and his approval of what the TACM members were allowed to eat. She said that in the taped telephone conversations, no one had ever disagreed with Tony Alamo or his directives.
An order forever terminating parental rights must be based on clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A) (Repl. 2009). The inquiry on appeal is whether the trial court’s finding that the disputed fact was proven by clear and convincing evidence was clearly erroneous. Dinkins v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 207, 40 S.W.3d 286 (2001). Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof that will produce in the fact finder a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
There was ample evidence that Tony Alamo still controlled the daily affairs of the TACM. The TACM furnished the Krantzes their housing, transportation, and money to meet their daily needs. The Krantzes did not even consider that Tony Alamo’s actions, past or present, presented a danger to their children. Although they asserted that they would not permit abuse of their children, the circuit court found that their testimony was not credible. We give great deference to the circuit court as it is in a far superior position to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Posey v. Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 370 Ark. 500, 262 S.W.3d 159 (2007). Based upon this record, we cannot say that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that due to potential harm to the children if returned to the custody of the Krantzes, termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the juveniles.
Affirmed.
Footnotes

1. In Krantz v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2010 Ark.App. 316, the court of appeals affirmed the order adjudicating the Krantz children dependent-neglected, relying upon the reasoning set forth in Thorne v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2010 Ark.App. 317, substituted on denial of reh’g by 2010 Ark.App. 443, ___ S.W.3d ___.
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REID v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

2011 Ark. 187
ALPHONZO REID, Appellant,
v.
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Appellee.

No. 10-696.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered April 28, 2011.

COURTNEY HUDSON HENRY, Associate Justice.
Appellant Alphonzo Reid appeals an order of the Miller County Circuit Court terminating his parental rights to his child, C.R., born on May 28,—-. Other children involved in these proceedings include C.R.’s older siblings, A.R., born August 26, —-, and A.R.J., born September 10, —-.1 Appellant is a long-standing member of the Tony Alamo Christian Ministry (TACM) in Fouke, Arkansas. Today, we also consider the appeals of four other TACM families. For reversal, appellant argues that the circuit court’s grant of termination of his parental rights violated his constitutional guarantees of religious freedom; that the circuit court erred in ruling taped conversations between Tony Alamo and unidentified women as admissible; and that the evidence did not support the grounds for terminating his parental rights. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(a)(1) (2010), as this appeal presents an issue requiring the interpretation of the Arkansas Constitution. We affirm.
I. Facts
A confidential source provided Arkansas law enforcement officials with information concerning child maltreatment occurring at the TACM compound. Arkansas State Police Crimes Against Children Division assisted the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Arkansas State Police Criminal Investigation Division in their investigation of these allegations. On September 20, 2008, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) exercised a seventy-two-hour hold by removing six minor females, including A.R. and C.R., from immediate danger of severe maltreatment. On September 24, 2008, the circuit court entered an amended order for emergency custody that approved placement of A.R. and C.R. in DHS custody. The circuit court subsequently entered an order finding probable cause to believe that the juveniles were dependent-neglected and that emergency conditions existed that necessitated the removal of the juveniles from appellant’s custody.
Following an adjudication hearing, the circuit court entered an order, finding that the juveniles were dependent-neglected as a matter of law; that appellant failed to protect his children against physical abuse; and that appellant was aware of the pattern and practice of severe physical beatings known within the closed community of TACM as “spankings” or “proverbs.” The court also found that appellant failed to protect the children against the risk of improper sexual contact and sexual abuse by knowingly placing them in the residence of Tony Alamo, whom the court referred to as a known polygamist. The court ruled that appellant endorsed and facilitated illegal marriages of underage females, including his daughters, to adult males. The court noted that appellant was aware that Tony Alamo claimed to be married to multiple wives during 2006, 2007, and 2008, when A.R. and C.R. lived at TACM. The court further noted that appellant allowed these juveniles to live at TACM unsupervised by anyone other than Tony Alamo and his co-polygamists. The court found that appellant was neglectful in failing to provide reasonable medical care to A.R. and C.R. by failing to obtain or to maintain current immunizations as required by state law; by failing to reasonably assure that they received adequate educations; by failing to properly register the children in an accredited school with certified teachers or to properly register and provide home schooling; and by committing abuse by condoning and permitting involuntary fasts imposed upon children younger than fifteen years of age.
In its order, the court ruled that the children needed DHS services and ordered DHS to develop a case plan. The court ordered supervised visitation and school attendance. Appellant was ordered to submit to a psychological evaluation, attend counseling, complete parenting classes, obtain safe and stable housing separate and apart from TACM and its members, obtain stable employment separate and apart from the organization and its members, allow DHS access to his home for home visits, and comply with the case plan. The court ordered DHS to provide these services. Appellant appealed the circuit court’s order adjudicating his daughters, A.R. and C.R., dependent-neglected, and the court of appeals affirmed. See Reid v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2009 Ark.App. 784.2 DHS filed a second dependency-neglect petition seeking emergency custody of other children, including A.R.J., who lived at TACM. On January 12, 2009, the circuit court held an adjudication hearing for these children who resided on the Alamo property, and the court found A.R.J. and the others dependent-neglected. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s ruling in Reid v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2010 Ark.App. 156.
The circuit court conducted a review hearing in April 2009 and subsequently entered an order, dated April 15, 2009, finding that the case plan met the needs of the children. The court found that DHS made reasonable efforts to provide services and that appellant had complied with the case plan by completing his psychological evaluation and parenting classes and by allowing DHS into his home. By September 2, 2009, the circuit court entered a permanency-planning order finding that the children remained in need of DHS services and that returning them to appellant’s custody was contrary to the children’s welfare. The court determined that it was in C.R.’s best interest to terminate parental rights with the goal of adoption. However, with regard to A.R. and A.R.J., the court found that it was not in their best interest to terminate parental rights but instead established a permanent goal of Another Planned Permanent Living Arrangement (APPLA).3 The court found that appellant partially complied with the case plan and court orders by obtaining a psychological evaluation and by completing parenting classes, but the court found that appellant had not followed the recommendations of the psychological evaluation, had not obtained safe and stable housing, had not obtained employment separate and apart from TACM, and was not paying regular child support. The court ordered the children to attend school daily and ordered appellant to pay child support. The court also ordered DHS to work toward a permanency plan for C.R. and to provide independent living services to A.R. and A.R.J. The court also ordered continued supervised visitation.

DHS filed a petition for termination of parental rights with regard to C.R. on September 10, 2009. In its TPR petition, DHS alleged several grounds, including that C.R. had been out of the home for a period in excess of twelve months and that, despite meaningful efforts by DHS to rehabilitate the home and correct the conditions causing removal, those conditions had not been remedied by appellant.
On December 4, 2009, appellant filed a motion to eliminate two requirements from the case plan, claiming that the conditions were unconstitutional. Those two case-plan requirements included (1) that appellant must abandon any housing supplied, paid for, or furnished by TACM and (2) that appellant must sever employment ties with TACM. In his motion, appellant claimed that these two case-plan requirements violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as rights guaranteed under article 2, section 24 of the Arkansas Constitution. Citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), appellant argued in his brief that these case-plan requirements burdened his free exercise of religion because his time to spread TACM’s evangelical message would be severely limited.
On January 27, 2010, the circuit court held a TPR hearing, which consisted of a global phase and a specific phase for each parent and their children. During the global phase, DHS presented, through the testimony of Salisa Templeton, a lieutenant employed at the Bowie County Correctional Center known as Bi-State, a compact disc that contained recordings of more than 250 conversations between Tony Alamo and various unidentified women during his time in jail. Appellant’s counsel raised hearsay objections to these recordings, arguing that they were not the records of Bi-State but Global TelLink and that Alamo was not a party to the proceedings, and thus, the recordings could not be admitted as statements against interest. Counsel for appellant also argued that they were inadmissible as prejudicial under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 403. The circuit court ruled that the telephone recordings were business records and that their probative value outweighed any prejudice. During the global phase of the hearing, appellant also argued that the requirements of moving from TACM and seeking employment outside the ministry infringed upon his religious-freedom rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and article 2, section 24 of the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the State presented a compelling governmental interest to protect its children.
Also during the global phase of the TPR hearing, Ben Franks, a CASA volunteer, testified that, in federal prison, inmates were allowed phone calls, supervised visitation with children under the age of sixteen who were accompanied by an adult, and unlimited correspondence with family. Malynda Cree, the CASA program director in Texarkana, testified that the communal lifestyle of the children involved in the Alamo cases was unsafe based upon the occurrences of physical abuse, marriage of minors, and sexual abuse. Cindy Allen, a DCFS supervisor, testified that she worked with DCFS workers in appellant’s case. She testified that she believed appellant could not go against Alamo’s directions and that he had not taken the steps to remedy the reasons that caused removal. She stated that none of the parents had obtained safe and stable housing apart from TACM, and none of the parents had sought a reliable means of supporting their children apart from the ministry.
During the specific phase of the hearing, Miranda Raines, a DCFS family service worker in Saline County, testified that she supervised appellant’s visits with his children. They included Tamela Reid, a majority-aged sibling who resided at TACM; A.R., who was eighteen years of age and chose not to attend some visits; A.R.J.; and C.R. Raines relayed that appellant interacted with the children, but she recalled a time when appellant and the children’s therapist got into a heated argument, and appellant, in the presence of the children, slammed his hand against a door. On cross-examination, Raines admitted that C.R. appeared to love appellant but that appellant made the children uncomfortable when he yelled at their counselor.
Terry Yoya, a DHS employee in Hempstead County, testified that she had worked with the Reid family since November 2008 shortly after the children were placed in foster care. She testified that appellant did not attend three staffings on the case plan. She noted that appellant did undergo a psychiatric evaluation and appeared to have an overall functioning level in the low-average range. According to the psychiatric evaluation, appellant tended to parrot information, was easily led by others, and appeared naive in his responses. Yoya testified that appellant completed his parenting classes and attended his initial appointment at a nearby counseling facility, but he did not attend any subsequent appointments. Yoya further stated that appellant did not obtain housing and that he declined the offer of a housing voucher. Yoya also testified that she discussed appellant’s employment options and that he expressed an interest in becoming a truck driver, but ultimately, appellant did not seem agreeable to obtaining separate employment outside TACM. Yoya expressed her belief that appellant was not capable of protecting C.R. from harm. She stated that appellant never really parented his children because they had not ever lived with him. Yoya testified that the members of TACM were required to care for C.R. while appellant “traveled around to different jobs.” Finally, Yoya testified that she believed it was in C.R.’s best interest to terminate appellant’s parental rights. Yoya described C.R. as a mild-mannered, sweet, well-behaved child who likely would be placed for adoption.
Gayla Griffin, a DHS adoption specialist, testified that, while she had not met C.R., she was familiar with the adoption database, and she knew families who were willing to adopt children with C.R.’s profile. Griffin testified that C.R. would likely be adopted. Jackie Mundie, C.R.’s foster mother, testified that she enrolled C.R. in third grade in a local elementary school, and, despite finding the schoolwork challenging, C.R. received Bs and Cs and awards for good citizenship and perfect attendance. Sheila Keever, a CASA volunteer, testified that she recommended the termination of appellant’s parental rights.

Toward the conclusion of the TPR hearing, appellant testified that he came to TACM in 1971 and had been employed by TACM since that time. Appellant described his work for the ministry as maintenance work. He testified that he performed various projects at different locations of TACM between 2004 and 2008. Appellant stated that he raised his children until his wife left in 2004. Appellant testified that he worked for the Alamo ministry in California when C.R. was taken into foster care and that C.R. lived with Tamela and A.R. at TACM during that time. During his testimony, appellant admitted to “whop[ping]” his children, but he denied sexually abusing them. Appellant testified that he took the children to the dentist and attended one staffing meeting, one counseling appointment, and most visitation. Appellant admitted that he had not gained employment outside of TACM and explained that the ministry already provided him housing, food, and clothing. Appellant testified that Yoya never offered him a housing voucher or referred him to an employment service. According to appellant, he did not require separate housing because TACM already provided for his needs. Appellant further testified that he had not sought housing outside of TACM because he believed it to be a safe environment for his children.
At the conclusion of the TPR hearing, the circuit court ruled specifically on appellant’s motion on the two requirements of stable housing and employment and found that the State presented a compelling governmental interest in protecting its children. The court found that the case requirements burdened appellant’s religion “to some degree” but did not reach the point that it overrode the compelling state interest. The circuit court found that, because of the State’s compelling governmental interest, DHS “had the right to impose these requirements on the parents as part of its case plan.”
On April 16, 2010, the circuit court entered its order terminating the parental rights of appellant to C.R. and granting DHS the power to consent to adoption. In the order, the circuit court found that DHS had proved by clear and convincing evidence that C.R. resided outside appellant’s parental home in excess of twelve months, and despite a meaningful effort by DHS to rehabilitate the home, those conditions that caused removal had not been remedied. Specifically, the court found that services provided to appellant by DHS included a referral for a psychological evaluation, parenting classes, housing assistance, employment at the Work Force Center, and juvenile-counseling assistance. However, the court stated that appellant had refused counseling and had refused to seek housing and employment separate from TACM. The court also found that appellant willfully failed to provide significant material support for C.R. In addition, the court terminated on the ground that, subsequent to the filing of the original petition for dependency-neglect, other factors arose demonstrating that the return of the juvenile was contrary to her health, safety, and welfare, and despite DHS’s offer of appropriate family services, appellant had manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy those subsequent issues. After making a finding of adoptability and potential harm, the court ruled that termination of appellant’s parental rights was in C.R.’s best interest. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.
II. Points on appeal
A. Free Exercise of Religion
For the first point on appeal, appellant argues that the termination of his parental rights violated his constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article 2, section 24 of the Arkansas Constitution. Specifically, appellant urges this court to overrule Thorne v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2010 Ark.App. 443, ___ S.W.3d ___, because free-exercise-of-religion claims must be subjected to a strict-scrutiny analysis. Appellant claims this higher standard of scrutiny must be applied by this court in this case and that the court of appeals previously misapplied a balancing of interests of the children, parents, and the State. DHS responds that the heightened strict-scrutiny standard does not apply because the state action does not target religious activity.
Other appellant-parents from TACM have raised similar arguments to this court. In a separate opinion, we affirmed the circuit court’s ruling on the parents’ free-exercise-of-religion claims. See Myers v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___. We affirm the circuit court’s ruling involving C.R. for the same reasons expressed in the Myers opinion.

B. Admissibility of Telephone Recordings
For the second point on appeal, appellant challenges the circuit court’s ruling that admitted into evidence the taped conversations between Tony Alamo and unidentified women from TACM. Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in determining that the recordings were business records, pursuant to Rule 803(6) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, and that the taped recordings should have been excluded on hearsay grounds because Tony Alamo was not a party to the proceedings and the recordings could not be deemed as statements against his interest. Appellant contends that the recordings’ probative value was substantially outweighed by undue prejudice. Appellant further asserts that the admission of the taped recordings violated the Confrontation Clause. In response, DHS argues that the taped recordings were not hearsay and, as a result, the circuit court’s ruling was not clearly erroneous.
Other appellant-parents from the Alamo ministry have raised similar arguments to this court. In a separate opinion, we affirmed the circuit court’s ruling on the admissibility of the Alamo taped phone recordings. See Myers v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___. We affirm the circuit court’s ruling involving C.R. for the same reasons expressed in the Myers opinion.
C. Termination of Appellant’s Parental Rights
For the third point on appeal, appellant argues that the circuit court erred in terminating his parental rights. Specifically, appellant contends that DHS did not prove the grounds for terminating his parental rights by clear and convincing evidence.
The standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights is well established. When the burden of proving a disputed fact is by clear and convincing evidence, the question that must be answered on appeal is whether the trial court’s finding is clearly erroneous. Wade v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 337 Ark. 353, 990 S.W.2d 509 (1999). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. We give a high degree of deference to the trial court, as it is in a far superior position to observe parties before it and judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. With our standard of review in mind, we should consider whether the circuit court’s ruling was clearly erroneous.
Under Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b) (Repl. 2009), a circuit court may permanently terminate a parent’s rights to his or her children if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) termination is in the best interest of the children, and (2) one ground for termination exists. When considering whether termination is in the best interest of the children, the circuit court should consider the following factors:

(i) The likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted if the termination petition is granted; and
(ii) the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child, caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent[.]
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A). With regard to the potential-harm factor, we agree with the court of appeals’s reasoning in Lee v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 102 Ark.App. 337, 285 S.W.3d 277 (2008), that the circuit court is not required to find that actual harm would result or to affirmatively identify a potential harm. Instead, the harm analysis should be conducted in broad terms. See id. We further cite with approval the court of appeals opinion, McFarland v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 91 Ark.App. 323, 210 S.W.3d 143 (2005), that there is no requirement that the aforementioned factors in subsections (i) and (ii) be established by clear and convincing evidence. Rather, after consideration of all the factors, the evidence must be clear and convincing that the termination is in the best interest of the child. See id.
As grounds for termination, Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a) (Repl. 2009) provides that the children remain out of the home for over twelve (12) months and, despite a meaningful effort by the department to rehabilitate the parent and correct the conditions that caused removal, those conditions have not been remedied by the parent.
With these TPR principles in mind, we turn to the present case. Here, DHS presented evidence that termination of appellant’s parental rights was in C.R.’s best interest. First, Gayla Griffin, a DHS adoption specialist, testified that C.R. would likely be adopted with one of the families in the DHS adoption database. Additionally, DHS employee, Terry Yoya, testified that C.R. would likely be adopted. Second, potential harm included appellant’s unwillingness to comply with the case plan by failing to find suitable housing outside TACM where young girls were repeatedly subjected to marriages while still minors, sexual abuse, involuntary fastings, and severe physical abuse. According to the global testimony presented at trial, Alamo continued to direct many details of the ministry, including the disbursement of food and punishment. Coupled with the potential harm of Alamo’s pervasive control of TACM from federal prison, appellant continued to reside at TACM where Alamo members oversaw the daily activities of the ministry. According to a psychiatric evaluation, appellant maintained a low-average functioning and appeared to be easily led by others. Thus, appellant’s failure to comply with the case plan, particularly the failure to find suitable housing apart from TACM where he could raise his daughter, displayed an inherent risk of subjecting C.R. to further potential harm at TACM. The circuit court’s best-interest determination is not clearly erroneous.
Finally, as grounds for termination, the circuit court found that the children had been out of the home for over twelve (12) months and, despite a meaningful effort by the department to rehabilitate the parent and correct the conditions that caused removal, those conditions have not been remedied by the parent. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-273-41(b)(3)(B)(i)(a). In this case, C.R. had been out of TACM for over twelve months. A joint exhibit stipulating numerous facts in the case included that the children, including C.R., had been out of the home for more than twelve months. Further, ample evidence showed that DHS made reasonable efforts to provide services, which included supervised visitation, psychiatric evaluation, counseling, and parenting classes. Appellant’s case plan also directed appellant to obtain safe and stable housing, as well as stable employment separate and apart from TACM. Despite these numerous efforts, however, appellant did not comply with the case plan. Appellant did not attend all of his required counseling sessions and attended only one staffing meeting. More significantly, he admitted in his testimony that he failed to obtain housing and employment separate and apart from TACM. Therefore, this evidence fulfilled the statutory requirements for TPR on the first ground. Only one ground is necessary to terminate parental rights. See Dinkins v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 207, 40 S.W.3d 286 (2001) (holding that the lower court’s error in finding that the appellant willfully failed to provide support was harmless based on an alternate ground to support the termination of parental rights). Accordingly, based upon our standard of review, we hold that the circuit court properly terminated appellant’s parental rights to C.R.
Affirmed.

Footnotes
1. Throughout most the proceedings, the whereabouts of the natural mother, Cynthia Yates, remained unknown. At appellant’s termination of parental rights (TPR) hearing, the circuit court rescheduled a separate TPR hearing for the mother. This appeal does not concern her parental rights.
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2. We note that the court of appeals referred to appellant as Alphonso Reid. However, our record indicates a different spelling, and we note the case name accordingly.
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3. DHS may authorize a plan for APPLA that includes a permanent planned living arrangement, including independent living services and supervision, pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-338(c)(6) (Repl. 2009).

To protect the identity of the victims they have been referred to as Jane Doe 1-5 throughout this document